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Aircraft loss of control (LOC) is a leading cause of fatal accidents across all transport 
airplane and operational classes.  LOC can result from a wide spectrum of precursors (or 
hazards), often occurring in combination.  Technologies developed for LOC prevention and 
recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of conditions and uncertainties, 
including multiple hazards, and the validation process must provide a means of assessing 
system effectiveness and coverage of these hazards.  This paper provides a detailed description 
of a methodology for analyzing LOC as a dynamics and control problem for the purpose of 
developing effective technology solutions.  The paper includes a definition of LOC based on 
several recent publications, a detailed description of a refined LOC accident analysis process 
that is illustrated via selected example cases, and a description of planned follow-on activities 
for identifying future potential LOC risks and the development of LOC test scenarios.  Some 
preliminary considerations for LOC of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and for their safe 
integration into the National Airspace System (NAS) are also discussed.    
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CAST  = Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
DoD  = Department of Defense 
ICAO  = International Civil Aviation Organization  
LOC  = Loss of Control (in-flight) 
NAS  = National Airspace System 
NASA  =  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NextGen  = Next Generation Airspace Operations Concept 
NIA  = National Institute of Aerospace 
NTSB  =  National Transportation Safety Board 
SME  = Subject Matter Expert 
TSB  =  Canadian Transportation Safety Board  
UAS  = Unmanned Aerial System 
I. Introduction 
 
ircraft loss of control (LOC) is a leading cause of fatal accidents across all transport airplane and operational 
classes. 1, 2, 3  The development and validation of technologies for LOC prevention and recovery poses significant 
challenges.  Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of precursor events and hazards, often occurring in 
combination 4 , which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation.  Technologies developed for LOC prevention and 
recovery must therefore be effective (i.e., resilient) under a wide variety of conditions and uncertainties, including 
multiple LOC precursors and hazards, and the validation process must provide some measure of assurance that the 
new vehicle safety technologies do no harm – i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks. 
Onboard systems technologies have been developed by NASA as part of a holistic approach for LOC prevention 
and recovery.5, 6  A validation framework involving analysis, simulation, and experimental testing has also been 
developed by NASA for safety-critical integrated systems operating under hazardous conditions that can lead to LOC 
7, 8, and a preliminary set of LOC test scenarios 9 was developed based on a limited set of flight accidents.  Preliminary 
analysis results have been reported 10 for a comprehensive set of transport aircraft accidents over a recent 15-year 
period (1996 – 2010), including a methodology for the identification of worst-case combinations of causal and 
contributing factors and how they sequence in time.  This analysis, when complete, will be used in the development 
of a set of LOC test scenarios that can be used in the validation of onboard systems technologies for LOC prevention 
and recovery.  Since enhanced engineering simulations are required for batch and piloted evaluations under realistic 
LOC precursor conditions, these test scenarios also serve as a high-level requirement for defining the simulation 
enhancements needed for generating realistic LOC test scenarios.  
Since publication of the preliminary analysis results for transport aircraft (see Ref. 11), the analysis process has 
been substantially refined and is being applied to the transport accidents and incidents identified in Ref. 11 as well as 
for the analysis of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) mishaps (i.e., accidents and incidents).  Refinement of the 
methodology includes the addition of LOC precursors, the addition of flags for quickly identifying key issues of 
interest for LOC, the identification of potential research solutions for each accident (if applicable), and the capture of 
specific comments for each precursor.  Each precursor comment is taken from the accident report and specifies why 
each precursor is included in the sequence.  This paper provides a detailed summary of this refined analysis 
methodology and provides some examples to illustrate it.  Section II presents an overview of recent definitions for 
transport aircraft LOC as well as the refined LOC problem definition used in performing the analysis. Section III 
provides a detailed description of the refined LOC accident analysis process, which is illustrated via selected example 
cases.  Individual hazards occurrences are also summarized in Section III for the mishaps analyzed to date.  Section 
IV describes the analysis products resulting from this work as well as follow-on research to identify future potential 
LOC risks and develop hazards-based test scenarios for use in the development and validation of technology solutions 
for LOC prevention and recovery.  Section V presents a discussion of the importance of LOC prevention and recovery 
for future resilient and autonomous systems as well as some preliminary considerations based on this work for the 
safe integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS).  Section VI  provides a summary of the paper and 
some concluding remarks. 
II. Aircraft Loss-of-Control (LOC) Problem Definition 
 LOC can be described as motion that is: outside the normal operating flight envelopes; not predictably altered by 
routine pilot control inputs; characterized by nonlinear effects, such as kinematic/inertial coupling; disproportionately 
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large responses to small state variable changes, or oscillatory/divergent behavior; likely to result in high angular rates 
and displacements; and characterized by the inability to maintain heading, altitude, and wings-level flight.11   LOC    
also includes situations in which the flight path is outside of acceptable tracking tolerances and cannot be predictably 
controlled by pilot (or autoflight system) inputs. 12  LOC is therefore fundamentally a dynamics and control problem. 
It is important to note that LOC need not be unrecoverable, but if left unaddressed it may become unrecoverable.  LOC 
is also a complex problem in that there are many causal and contributing factors that can lead to LOC (see Refs. 5 & 
11).  The primary causes include: entry into a vehicle upset condition; reduction or loss of control power; changes to 
the vehicle dynamic response in relation to handling/flying qualities; and combinations of these causes.  There are 
numerous factors that have historically led or contributed to LOC.  These can be grouped into three major categories: 
adverse onboard conditions, external hazards and disturbances, and abnormal flight conditions (or vehicle upsets).  
LOC causal and contributing factors within these categories are summarized in Fig. 1.  Adverse onboard conditions 
include vehicle problems (i.e., impairment, failures,  or damage) and inappropriate crew response.  External hazards 
and disturbances consist of inclement weather conditions, atmospheric disturbances, and obstacles that require abrupt 
maneuvering for avoidance.  Vehicle upset conditions include a variety of off-nominal or extreme flight conditions 
and abnormal trajectories.  The complexity of LOC is clearly illustrated in Fig. 1, particularly considering that many 
LOC accidents involve combinations of the causal and contributing factors that are listed. 
 
 
 
    
Figure 1.  LOC key characteristics, primary causes, and causal & contributing factors. 
 
 Onboard systems of the future must therefore be developed to provide LOC prevention and recovery capabilities 
under a wide variety of hazards (and their combinations) that can lead to LOC.  An integrated system concept for 
accomplishing this was presented in Ref. 6.  The validation of technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) 
prevention and recovery, such as that of Ref. 6, poses significant challenges.  The validation process must provide 
some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies are effective and that they do no harm – i.e., that 
they themselves do not introduce new safety risks.  Moreover, a means of assessing hazards coverage must also be 
included in the validation framework. A validation framework involving analysis, simulation, and experimental testing 
was previously developed for safety-critical integrated systems operating under hazardous conditions that can lead to 
LOC (see Refs. 8 & 9), and a preliminary set of LOC test scenarios was developed (see Ref. 10) based on a limited 
accident set.   
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III. LOC Accident Analysis Methodology and Example Cases 
 
This section presents a detailed methodology for the analysis of aircraft accidents and incidents, with the purpose 
of developing technology solutions for LOC prevention and recovery. The accident / incident set includes inflight 
LOC (LOC-I) accidents as categorized by the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team13 as well as other LOC 
accidents (e.g., resulting from control component failures and/or vehicle damage sufficient to alter vehicle dynamics 
and control characteristics) related to the definition of Section II but not typically included in the LOC-I accident 
category.  Refinement of the analysis methodology includes the addition of LOC precursors, the addition of flags for 
quickly identifying key issues of interest for LOC, the identification of potential research solutions for each accident 
(if applicable), and the capture of specific comments for each precursor.  Each precursor comment is taken from the 
accident report or supporting information and specifies why each precursor is included in the sequence.  In some cases, 
consensus comments by the analysis team have been added to enhance clarity. This section provides a detailed 
summary of this refined analysis methodology and provides some examples to illustrate it.   
A. Accident Set Definition  
 
Air carrier upset accidents were reviewed for the period 1996 through 2010. All reported mishaps to airplanes 
certified under Transport Category or Commuter Category were considered. The following databases were reviewed: 
 
- Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) 14 
- UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) 15 
- Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB) 16 
- French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile (BEA) 17 
- German Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchungin (BFU) 18 
- Irish Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) 19 
- National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 20 
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 21    
- Ascend Fleets from Flightglobal 22  
- Aviation Safety Network (ASN) 23 
- Aircraft Accident Report DVD 24 
 
Database coded event fields and narratives were queried for event categories and/or keywords such as “loss-of-
control,” “upset,” “unusual attitude,” “stall,” “crash out of control,” and “uncontrolled descent.”  All resulting database 
records and accident reports were reviewed by the authors to determine applicability to the study.  Military airplanes 
and accidents resulting from criminal or deliberate activities (e. g., Egyptair 990) or pilot incapacitation (e. g., Helios 
522) were culled from the list. Test operations were not considered nor were engine-out ferry flights, although 
positioning flights were included. 
The full accident / incident set is provided in Appendix A.  Some general statistics associated with the LOC 
accident / incident set of this study are summarized below in terms of number of events (or mishaps) and fatalities 
(onboard and ground) relative to phase of flight, aircraft type, operation, and five-year intervals. 
Table 1.  LOC Events and Fatalities Relative to  
a.) Five-Year Intervals, b.) Phase of Flight, c.) Aircraft Type, and d.) Operation 
a.) LOC Events by 5-Year Intervals 
 
Time Period Events Onboard Fatalities Ground Fatalities 
1995-2000 102 3007 81 
2001-2005 101 2143 135 
2006-2010 75 2104 19 
Total 278 7254 235 
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b.) LOC Events by Phase of Flight 
 
Flight Phase Events Onboard Fatalities Ground Fatalities 
Takeoff and Initial Climb 85 1511 94 
Climb 44 1767 33 
Cruise 43 2008 78 
Descent 17 157 0 
Holding 2 0 0 
Approach 47 805 23 
VFR Pattern 2 5 0 
Circling 3 175 0 
Landing 18 39 0 
Go-Around 10 116 0 
Missed Approach 7 671 7 
Total 278 7254 235 
 
c.) LOC Events by Aircraft Classification 
 
Aircraft Classification Events Onboard Fatalities Ground Fatalities 
Wide-body Turbojets 38 2224 17 
Narrow-body Turbojets 83 3850 170 
Business Jets 57 187 15 
Turboprop Transports 45 620 31 
Piston Transports 5 34 0 
Commuter Airplanes 50 339 2 
Total 278 7254 235 
 
d.) LOC Events by Type of Operation 
 
Operation Events Onboard Fatalities Ground Fatalities 
Scheduled Airlines 147 5900 170 
Non-Scheduled Airlines 85 1206 52 
Non-Revenue Operations 29 78 6 
Executive Transportation 17 70 7 
Total 278 7254 235 
 
B. Accident Analysis Methodology 
 
The accident analysis methodology was based on the sequential precursor model, which defines an accident as a 
series of connected events that ultimately lead to an undesired outcome.  If a precursor event can be eliminated by an 
intervention, the accident/incident can be prevented.  For this study, the methodology was designed to identify 
dominant precursors for each accident and the associated temporal sequencing.  In contrast to typical root cause 
analysis, the precursors were selected by identifying all relevant hazards that sequentially led to the mishap (as 
opposed to the primary / root cause) to better understand LOC more holistically as a multiple-hazards event and 
thereby enable the development of research and technology interventions that are effective across a wide spectrum of 
key LOC hazards and their combinations (as opposed to developing separate technologies that target a single hazard).  
The precursors, shown in Table 2, were defined by the team based on the previous accident analysis of references 5-
6 and were further updated during the analysis process.  The wording of each precursor was carefully defined to 
correlate with terminology typically seen in accident reports and to minimize ambiguities.  Some precursors, such as 
those under “Vehicle Upset,” were derived from recent references (e.g., Refs. 4,12) and further, more specific 
definitions may warrant additional research.  An important distinction with this analysis was that the goal was to 
identify potential technology interventions that merit further research, rather than the root cause or specific near-term 
interventions.  Therefore some accidents were included in the database that did not clearly fit the specific definition 
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of a LOC event but contained important precursor information that added substantially to the analysis or should be 
considered for future analysis.  
 
Table 2. LOC Precursors / Hazards Set Used in the Accident Analysis 
 
Precursor Categories Subcategories Precursors / Hazards 
Adverse Onboard 
Conditions 
Vehicle  
Impairment 
Improper Maintenance Action/Inaction/Procedure 
Inappropriate Vehicle Configuration 
Contaminated Airfoil 
Smoke/Fire/Explosion 
Improper Loading: Weight/Balance.CG 
Airframe Structural Damage 
Engine Damage (FOD) 
System & Components 
Failure/Malfunction 
System Design/Validation Error/Inadequacy 
System SW Design/Verification Error/Inadequacy 
Control Component Failure/Inadequacy 
Engine F/M 
Sensor System F/M 
Flight Deck Instrumentation Malfunction/Inadequacy 
System F/M (Non-Control Component) 
Crew Action/Inaction Loss of Attitude State Awareness/SD 
Loss of Energy State Awareness 
Lack of Aircraft/System State Awareness 
Aggressive Maneuver 
Abnormal/Inadvertent Control Input 
Improper/Ineffective Recovery 
Inadequate Crew Resource Monitoring/Management 
Improper/Incorrect/Inappropriate Procedure/Action 
Fatigue/Impairment/Incapacitation 
External Hazards &  
Disturbances 
Inclement Weather & 
Atmospheric 
Disturbances 
Thunderstorms/Rain 
Wind Shear 
Wind/Turbulence 
Wake Vortex 
Snow/Icing 
Poor Visibility Fog, Haze 
Night 
Obstacle Fixed Obstacle 
Moving Obstacle 
Abnormal Vehicle 
Dynamics 
& Upsets 
Abnormal Vehicle 
Dynamics 
Uncommanded Motions, 
Oscillatory Response (Includes PIO) 
Abnormal Control for Trim/Flight and/or Control 
Asymmetry 
Abnormal/Counterintuitive Control Response 
Vehicle Upset  
Conditions 
Abnormal Attitude 
Abnormal Airspeed/Energy 
Abnormal Angular Rates 
Undesired Abrupt Response 
Abnormal Flight Trajectory 
Vmc / Departure 
Stall / Departure  
 
The analysis was based solely on publicly-available formal accident reports and associated supporting documents 
when available.  For example, knowledge of sub-system design and performance specific to the aircraft was included 
when appropriate to clarify the precursor or temporal sequencing.  Each accident was reviewed and precursors 
identified in a consensus format and the results were recorded in a spreadsheet document to facilitate data analysis. 
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An illustration of the analysis spreadsheet used in the analysis process is provided in Appendix B.  The team based 
the precursor analysis on the published information verbatim and did not inject additional analysis or conclusions. In 
some cases the accident reports were very limited, which resulted in minimal identified precursors. The temporal 
sequencing was established by assigning a number to the precursors and in some cases a precursor may have occurred 
more than once.  In most cases, the ending precursor was under the category of “Vehicle Upset Conditions”.  Because 
some precursors were somewhat broad in definition, the associated text that was used to justify that precursor was 
included in the database for completeness and further analysis.  
As part of the database, three broad technology categories were flagged for potential relevance to the accident, 1) 
crew distraction,  2) human-machine interface, and 3) mitigation through research including training.  These 
categories, though not specific precursors, were included due to numerous important and recent studies to address 
these areas but which were not necessarily addressed in the accident reports.  In addition, comments were included to 
highlight important aspects of the accident that were not necessarily included in a precursor.  
 Once the precursor sequences are identified, an analysis can be performed to identify worst-case precursor 
combinations and precursor sequences.  “Worst case” in this context is in terms of the number of accidents and 
fatalities.  Worst case precursor combinations are identified using three-dimensional scatter plots with the three 
dimensions corresponding to the three precursor categories identified in Table 2.  The preliminary analysis results 
documented in Ref. 10 illustrated these scatter plots at the sub-category and precursor levels.  An example from Ref. 
10 is included in Appendix C for convenience.  Worst-case precursor sequences can be identified using pivot tables 
in Excel.  All sequences associated with an initiating precursor can be drawn with the number of associated accidents 
and fatalities for each sequence.  Examples from Ref. 10 of worst case sequence identification are also included in 
Appendix C.  Individual precursor statistics can also be computed, as illustrated in Ref. 10 and summarized for the 
mishaps analyzed to date in Subsection III-D.   
C. Accident Analysis Example  
 
To illustrate the potential use of the database and analysis methodology, an analysis of eight accidents and incidents 
involving blocked pitot tubes or static port is presented.  Table 3 provides a summary of these accidents and incidents.   
 
Table 3. LOC Accidents and Incidents from the Data Set Involving Blocked Pitot Tubes 
 
Accident 
No. Date Location Airline Flight No. Aircraft 
Phase of 
Flight Fatalities 
2 2/6/1996 Dominican Republic Birgenair 301 B-757-225 En Route 189 
14 10/2/1996 Peru AeroPeru 603 B-757 Climb 70 
37 10/10/1997 Uruguay 
Austral 
Lineas 
Aereas 
2553 DC-9 En Route 74 
62 4/7/1999 Ceyhan, Turkey 
THY 
Turkish 
Airlines 
5904 B-737 En Route 6 
142 10/20/2002 Baltimore, Maryland Icelandair 662 B-757 En Route 0 
188 5/12/2005 Missouri Midwest Airlines  MD-90 Initial Climb 0 
254 1/28/2009 Ghana 
Astraeus for 
Ghana 
Airways 
 B-757 Cruise 0 
260 6/1/2009 
Atlantic 
Ocean (Near 
Sao Paulo 
Archipelago) 
Air France 447 A-330 En Route 228 
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A description of the sensor system failure causes, symptoms, and outcomes is summarized below for the above 
mishaps. 
 
1 Causes of the Sensor System Failure: 
 
a Four sensor system failure events were caused by pitot icing.  
 
Pitot icing can affect all onboard air data systems, the pilot, copilot, and standby systems and all flight 
control systems that use air data. These include autopilots, flight directors, and some flight control 
functions. 
 
Three of the failures were caused by inoperative pitot heat (either switched off or failed). 
One was caused by atmospheric conditions that were worse than pitot design requirements 
 
b Three failure events were caused by a single blocked pitot tube. 
  
A single blocked pitot tube affects a single air data system, usually the pilot's or copilot’s systems. In this 
case, there will be disagreement between the cockpit indications. 
 
Two failures occurred after pitot covers were left off overnight. 
One failure was caused by an internal blockage. 
 
c One failure event was caused by static ports being taped over by the maintenance crew. 
 
Blocking all static ports affects all onboard air data systems, the pilot, copilot, and standby systems and 
all flight control systems that use air data. These include autopilots, flight directors, and some flight 
control functions. 
 
2 Symptoms of the Sensor System Failure: 
a Seven failure events resulted in flight crew confusion with misleading or conflicting cues and warnings. 
It was not clear to the flight crews what was happening. Attempts to isolate the failed systems appeared 
to be ineffective because the selection logic for airspeed/altitude input to autopilots or flight directors was 
not clear. The pilots did not understand what the effect of changing altitude had on their indications. 
Confusing warnings, such as MACH/SPD TRIM and RUDDER RATIO were shown with no previous 
training documented for the flight crews. Simultaneous overspeed and stall warnings were presented. 
 
b One failure event resulted in the copilot, who was flying,  seeing zero airspeed and immediately applying 
stall recovery which was intended for low altitude stalls and had the effect of causing loss of one slat 
which precluded recovery. 
 
3 Differences between accidents and incidents  
a Four accidents showed extreme confusion (as described above) in the flight deck. The crews were still 
trying to sort out the situation when they crashed, killing all onboard. 
 
b Three incidents showed the same confusion in the flight deck with the same indications. Fortunately for 
all onboard, the crew finally reverted to basic pitch and power control and safely recovered the airplanes.  
 
Further analysis of these mishaps can be accomplished by identifying the precursor sequences and worst-case 
combinations associated with each accident and incident.  Figure 2 illustrates the accident sequence determined for 
the Birgenair accident of 1996, which corresponds to Accident No. 2 in Table 3.  The blocks in the sequence represent 
accident precursors (or hazards) that led to this accident. The comments below each box are taken from the accident 
report to reflect the team rationale for inclusion of each precursor.  These comments provide specific information from 
the accident or incident for each precursor / hazard in the sequence. 
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Figure 2.  LOC accident sequence for Birgenair 301 (2/6/1996). 
 
The precursor sequences developed for the eight blocked pitot tube or static port mishaps of Table 3 are provided in 
Appendix D.  Some initial observations in analyzing the precursor sequences include the following: 
 
1) What started the event? 
a. 37.5% (3/8) of the events started with an “Improper Maintenance Action/Inaction.” This means 
that 37.5% of these mishaps may have been able to be avoided with proper ground crew actions or 
adequate preflight by the flight crew – assuming the other hazards and hazards combinations could 
be mitigated successfully. 
b. 50% (4/8) of the remaining mishaps seem to have pitot tube icing as an initiating precursor (under 
snow, thunderstorm, or other icing conditions). 
c. The remaining event (1/8) started with a pitot tube sensor failure, though reasons for the blockage 
could not be determined. 
2) What do the fatality cases all have in common? 
a. Three of the five (or 60%) are characterized by “Improper/Ineffective Recovery.” This precursor 
could potentially be added to mishap #62 as well, but information is limited for this case. Adding 
it would make 4/5 (or 80%). 
b. One aircraft suffered structural damage that resulted in an inability to control the aircraft. The 
pilots likely could not make a proper recovery given the damage. 
c. All of the fatal events experienced a serious vehicle upset condition, with 80% (4/5) involving 
stall / departure and the fifth event involving uncontrolled descent. 
d. Three of the five fatal accidents (60%) involved flight deck instrumentation and/or auto-flight 
system issues (operational errors, inadequacy, etc.). 
e. In 4/5 cases (80%) there were also a “Loss of Awareness” issue in either aircraft / system state, 
energy, or attitude.  
3) What’s different about the nonfatal incident cases? 
a. All three of these incidents (142, 188, and 254) led to vehicle upsets, although only one event 
involved vehicle stall, and the pilots were able to recover the aircraft. 
b. There were still pilot issues as all three had either an “Improper/Incorrect Procedure” or 
“Abnormal Control Input.” 
c. Only one of the three (#254) had a “Lack of Aircraft System State Awareness,” but this was 
limited to the mode switching that was occurring in the background. 
In general, the fatal accidents appear to be more complicated (i.e., involving more precursors) than the nonfatal 
incidents.  A comparison of event complexity can be performed by analyzing the worst case precursor combinations 
using 3-D scatter plots.  Figure 3 shows the precursor combinations for the fatal accidents (Figure 3a) and nonfatal 
incidents (Figure 3b).  The axes represent Vehicle Hazards, External Hazards & Disturbances, and Crew Action / 
Inaction.  These axes were selected to identify the hazards combinations involved in these mishaps, and to enable a 
more detailed identification of the specific hazards involved.  Since all of these mishaps involved a sensor system 
failure (resulting from a blocked pitot tube or static port), this precursor is assumed and not included in Figure 3.  The 
planes along the External Hazards and Disturbances axis are used to identify the precursor combinations for each 
mishap.  The nodes (or spheres) in Figure 3 identify hazard combinations, where sphere size is proportional to the 
number of accidents and sphere color relates to the number of fatalities (as indicated by the legend of Figure 3).     
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(a.) 
 
 
 
(b.) 
 
Figure 3.  Three-Dimensional (3-D) Scatter Plots Showing Precursor Combinations for  
(a.) Fatal Accidents and (b.) Nonfatal Incidents 
Considering the fatal accidents first, it is easy to see from Figure 3a that there are many hazards combinations 
occurring for #2, #37, #260, and #14.  Mishap #62 is the least complex in terms of hazards combinations, but this 
event involves snow/icing conditions, loss of state awareness by the crew, abnormal control inputs, and entry into 
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stall.   Mishap #14 involves multiple ineffective crew actions (improper pre-flight inspection, inadequate crew resource 
management, loss of state awareness, and ineffective recovery), flight deck instrumentation issues, and two serious 
upset conditions (stall / departure and uncontrolled descent).  Accidents #2, #37, and #260 are the most complex, with 
#260 being both the most recent fatal accident and the most complex.  All three of these events involve both flight 
deck instrumentation and autoflight system issues (operational errors, inadequacies, etc.), multiple crew hazards 
(including loss of state awareness, abnormal control inputs, and ineffective recovery), and stall / departure.  Mishap 
#2 occurred under poor visibility conditions, #37 occurred under thunderstorms / rain conditions, and #260 involved 
both of these external hazards.  Mishap #37 also involved vehicle impairment that resulted from an inappropriate 
configuration that led to structural damage and abnormal vehicle dynamics and control. 
 By comparison, the nonfatal incidents of Figure 3b are much less complex involving fewer hazards combinations.  
Incident #188 is the simplest event involving a single combination of snow / icing, abnormal control input, and 
abnormal attitude / trajectory.  Incident #142 is slightly more complicated. Although there is no involvement by 
External Hazards & Disturbances, it does involve flight deck instrumentation and stall / departure, but only involves 
improper procedure by the crew.  The final incident, #254, occurred under poor visibility conditions, involved the 
auto-flight system, two crew hazards (improper procedure and loss of state awareness), and abnormal attitude.  The 
only stall event was not complicated further by inclement weather or poor visibility, nor by multiple instances of 
ineffective crew involvement.  The other two incidents never entered into more severe vehicle upset conditions (such 
as stall / departure or controlled descent).  
It is noted that very few incident investigations get the level of attention  given to fatal accidents, but it would be 
difficult to quantify this difference (e.g., length of the report, length of the investigation, number of parties to the 
investigation, etc.) and thereby determine any potential impact this may have on complexity findings.  It is also noted 
that the flight crews of the incidents were able to “break the chain” of events and thereby avert an accident.  However, 
this could be either a cause or effect of less complexity.  That is, less complex events may be easier for crews to 
identify and correct before they become an accident, or breaking the chain earlier in the sequence of events could 
prevent progression to a more highly complex event.  Regardless, it is worth noting that the complexity of some 
circumstances make it less likely that crews will be able to correctly identify and correct the situation before it 
progresses too far. 
 The comments and flags included in the analysis process can also provide some insight into key issues and potential 
methods for mitigating through research.  Tables of this data are contained in Appendix D.  In three of the five fatal 
accidents, the crew was distracted or overwhelmed by conditions related to the pitot system failure (with one of these 
accidents exacerbated by the presence of cabin crew in the cockpit).  Four of the five fatal accidents involved potential 
human-machine interface issues, with the accident report for the fifth accident lacking enough information to make 
this determination.  In some cases the auto-flight system flew the aircraft into stall (due to the erroneous airspeed 
indications), and flight deck instrumentation provided little information for improved situation awareness and no 
guidance on appropriate actions to take.  Moreover, in some instances multiple conflicting warnings and alerts were 
sounding simultaneously – which further confused the crew.  In contrast, none of the non-fatal incidents involved 
crew distraction.  Although the onboard systems provided similar opportunities for confusion or to further exacerbate 
the situation, the comparatively less complex hazards profile enabled the pilots to successfully recover to a safe flight 
condition. 
Comparing the fatal and nonfatal mishaps of this study, it can be concluded that there is a level of hazards 
complexity at which pilots (or any human) become confused and are unable to respond effectively.  Moreover, current 
systems are essentially designed for nominal conditions and either disengage or respond inappropriately (adding 
additional confusion to the situation).  Some potential mitigation strategies to prevent these kinds of mishaps in the 
future are provided in the tables of Appendix D for each mishap, and summarized here as follows: 
1. Improved pilot training relative to diagnosing and mitigating onboard system failures (including sensor 
system failures and use of alternate instrumentation); 
2. Improved crew training under unexpected and abnormal conditions (including multiple hazards events) 
and in the implications of existing protections associated with system operational modes; 
3. Sensor integrity management system capable of detecting, identifying and mitigating sensor system 
failures (including blocked pitot tube or static ports and common mode sensor failures); 
4. Improved algorithms and displays that provide improved situational awareness to the systems and crew 
under multiple hazards conditions; 
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5. Resilient flight control system capable of ensuring flight safety under multiple hazards (including 
system failures, external disturbances, and inappropriate control inputs by the crew and/or autoflight 
systems); 
6. Resilient upset recovery system capable of providing guidance for and/or automatic recovery from upset 
conditions (including stall) under multiple hazards conditions. 
D. Individual Hazards Occurrences   
 
To date, the team has analyzed 122 of the 278 mishaps in the set using the analysis approach described herein.  
Individual occurrences of the precursors / hazards, arranged by the categories identified in Table 2, in the accident 
data analyzed to date are shown in Figures 4, 5 and 6 for Adverse Onboard Conditions, External Hazards & 
Disturbances, and Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics & Upsets, respectively. 
 
      
(a.)  (b.) 
 
 
(c.) 
 
Figure 4.  Percent Occurrence of Hazards from Adverse Onboard Conditions Resulting from  
(a.) Vehicle Impairment, (b.) System & Component Failures, and (c.) Crew Actions / Inactions. 
 
Relative to hazards from Adverse Onboard Conditions (see Figure 4), airframe structural damage has occurred in 
approximately 25% of the mishaps analyzed to date, and system and component failures have occurred in a large 
percentage of mishaps and are fairly evenly distributed at 15% each involving control component failures, engine 
failures, and flight deck instrumentation malfunctions, with system operational errors, sensor system failures, and 
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system failures (non-control components) occurring in approximately 10 – 12% of the accidents and incidents.  Crew 
actions / inactions are dominated by loss of attitude and energy state awareness at approximately 27% and 17%, 
respectively, improper procedure at approximately 27%, inadequate crew resource monitoring or management at 
approximately 23%, and improper or ineffective recovery at about 19%. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Percent Occurrence of Hazards from External Hazards & Disturbances. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Percent Occurrence of Hazards from Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics & Upsets. 
 
External Hazards and Disturbances (see Figure 5) are dominated by night visibility issues at approximately 22%, 
with snow or icing occurring in a little more than 10% of the mishaps evaluated to date.  Other key external hazards 
include thunderstorms / rain at 9%, moving obstacles at 8%, and visibility issues related to fog or haze at 7%. 
Hazards associated with Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics and Upsets (see Figure 6) are dominated by uncontrolled 
descent (which occurred in approximately 34% of the mishaps analyzed thus far) and stall / departure (which occurred 
in approximately 30%).  Other key hazards related to vehicle upset conditions include abnormal / unusual attitude and 
abnormal flight trajectory (each occurring in approximately 15% of the mishaps analyzed to date).  Hazards related to 
abnormal vehicle dynamics occurred less frequently, with uncommanded motion occurring in approximately 8.5% of 
the mishaps analyzed thus far, followed by abnormal control and/or control asymmetry (6%), oscillatory vehicle 
response (4%), and abnormal or counterintuitive control response (2%). 
Overall (i.e., looking at the entire set of plots in Figures 4 – 6), it appears that a relatively high percentage of the 
accidents analyzed to date have involved the human element, Crew Action / Inaction.  There is also a significant 
 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
14
contribution of poor visibility under night conditions within the External Hazards & Disturbances category, and of 
events involving uncontrolled descent and stall / departure under the Vehicle Upsets sub-category.  This may indicate 
the need for improved systems that better account for human involvement and provide improved man/machine 
interfaces. 
IV. Accident Analysis Products and Follow-On Research 
 
Analysis products will be made available from the process of Section III, and follow-on research is planned for 
the identification of future potential safety risks related to LOC and the development of LOC test scenarios based on 
the current and future hazards sets and their analysis.  The analysis products and follow-on research are described in 
the following subsections. 
A. Aircraft Accident Analysis Products  
 A goal of this effort is to facilitate further research on LOC as well as the development of technology solutions for 
LOC prevention and recovery.  The authors therefore plan to make the data and analysis files available online so that 
the LOC analysis of this study can be openly investigated and additional LOC studies can be performed by other 
groups.  Data files include the aircraft accident dataset described in Section III-A, accident summaries used in the 
analysis, and the full accident reports that have been obtained.  Analysis products from the work described in Section 
III-B include the analysis spreadsheet used to identify precursor sequences for the accidents in the data set, the 
spreadsheets used to organize the data for generating worst-case precursor combinations and sequences, and the 
references sited as being applicable to potentially addressing each accident or incident.  We also hope to develop an 
intelligent interface with links that enable querying the analysis results of this study.  For example, clicking on a worst-
case precursor combination sphere shown in Fig. B-1 would enable seeing lower level combinations (such as those 
shown in Fig. B-2) as well as a listing of which accidents and incidents from the set are represented in that combination. 
B.  Future Potential Risks 
 
In developing technology solutions for LOC prevention and recovery, it is not only important to understand current 
causal and contributing factors (or precursors) but also future potential risks.  The identification of future potential 
LOC risks is more difficult than current risks because there is no data that can be analyzed.  Future potential LOC 
risks will be identified by the authors by considering current trends and future directions.  A preliminary set of future 
potential LOC risks was identified in Ref. 10, and is repeated here for convenience in Table 4.   
 
Table 4. Potential future LOC risks listed by trend from Ref. 10. 
No. Current Trend / Future Direction Potential LOC Risk Factors
1 Increased Automation without Improved Crew Interfaces Increase in Inappropriate Crew Response 
2 Future Vehicle Configurations without Identification of Upset Characteristics Increased Incidents of Vehicle Upsets 
3 Increased System Complexity without Comprehensive Evaluation Process 
Increase in System Faults / Failures / Errors / 
Insufficiencies
4 High-Density Operations in Terminal Area Increase in Wake Vortex Encounters 
5 High-Density Operations in Terminal Area Increase in Pilot Workload 
6 Increase in Flight Deck Automation Decrease in Manual Piloting Skills 
7 All-Weather Operations Increase in Snow/Icing Encounters 
8 All-Weather Operations in Terminal Area Increase in Wind Shear / Turbulence Encounters
9 High-Density Mixed-Vehicle Operations Increased Incidence of Near-Miss and Mid-Air Collision Events 
10 New Vehicle Materials with Lack of Long-Term Data on Aging and Damage Tolerance Increase in Damage-Initiated LOC Events 
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Some of the trends / directions identified in Table 4 result from the NextGen Operations concept 25, 26 being developed 
for the next generation of the air transportation system.  Specifically, future directions 4, 7, 8, and 9 relate to NextGen 
Operations.  Although NextGen operations will ultimately improve safety, any change has the potential to introduce 
unintended risks.  The intention here is to identify these future potential risks in an effort to proactively address these 
in technology solutions that are effective mitigations of both current and future LOC risks.   
 Another current trend / future direction is the introduction of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National 
Airspace System (NAS). In this case, LOC risks can relate to the UAS as well as manned vehicles as a result of 
unexpected near-miss events involving UAS.  Relative to Table 4, future direction 9 includes risks associated with 
UAS operation near airports and we are already experiencing an increase in this risk27, 28, 29.  Other risks related to 
UAS LOC pertain to ground infrastructure and loss of life in developed areas.  These will directly relate to intended 
use cases for UAS by industry, government agencies, and academia, and the effectiveness (and far-sightedness) of 
regulations for UAS in the NAS developed by the FAA.  This is an expanding market with many use cases already 
identified and many more to come.  Some current potential use cases for UAS include search and rescue support, 
border patrol, infrastructure inspection, and package delivery.  These and future potential use cases will need to be 
studied to identify future potential risks related to safety and security (including LOC). 
 Increasing levels of autonomy in civil aviation30 is another current trend / future direction that could potentially 
impact future LOC risk.   This risk relates to future direction 3 in Table 4.   
 
C. LOC Test Scenarios 
 
Once the accident / incident analysis of section III and the future potential risks identified as discussed in Section 
IV-B are completed, a comprehensive set of hazards-based LOC test scenarios will be developed based on the current 
and future analysis results.  It is anticipated that the test scenarios will include multiple precursor hazards, including 
adverse vehicle conditions, inappropriate crew response, external hazards and disturbances, and vehicle upset 
conditions.  The test scenarios will include recommended evaluation methods, and flight conditions.  The test scenarios 
will be developed with traceability to the current and future hazards sets for use in resilience testing.  This traceability 
enables the evaluation of hazards coverage and technology effectiveness in providing that coverage.  Figure 7 
illustrates this concept. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Resilience Evaluation Concept for Determination of Effective LOC Hazards Coverage. 
 
A preliminary set of hazards-based test scenarios was developed in Ref. 10 to support the validation of safety-
critical systems developed for LOC prevention and recovery.  The authors intend that the hazards-based test scenarios 
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to be developed as part of this study can be utilized as a universal set of test scenarios for resilience testing of 
technologies for future safety-critical autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicle systems.   
V. LOC and Resilience Implications for Future Aircraft Systems 
 
LOC prevention and recovery is a key requirement for future resilient and autonomous aircraft systems as well as 
for the safe integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS).  Research and technology development 
needs are discussed in the following subsections. 
A. LOC Prevention and Recovery for Future Resilient Autonomous Aircraft Systems  
 
 LOC prevention and recovery is a critical capability for future safety-critical autonomous and semi-autonomous 
aircraft systems.  In particular, current and future LOC hazards and the hazards-based test scenarios described in 
Section IV provide a rich set of conditions for evaluating resilience under uncertain, unexpected, and hazardous 
conditions.  Figure 8 illustrates the importance of resilience for key aviation goals within the NASA Aeronautics 
Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) that will enable transformative capabilities in the future aviation system.  More 
detailed technology development and validation requirements for resilient autonomous and semi-autonomous systems 
are provided in Appendix E. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Importance of Resilience for Future Safety-Critical Autonomous Aircraft Systems. 
 
B. LOC Implications for Safe UAS Integration into the National Airspace System (NAS)  
 
 Research is currently underway in analyzing UAS accidents and incidents utilizing the LOC analysis 
methodology of Section III to UAS.  As discussed in Section IV, future potential safety risks associated with UAS 
operation in the NAS and hazards-based test scenarios for evaluating system resilience will also be developed with a 
focus on UAS relative to LOC as well as to a broader set of hazards.  Figure 9 depicts the current strategy for safety/risk 
analysis research.   
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Figure 9.  UAS Safety / Risk Analysis for NAS Operations. 
 
 
An analysis of current hazards will be based on an analysis of civil and military UAS mishaps similar to the approach 
described in Section III.  Future hazards will be identified based on concepts of operation for UAS Traffic Management 
(UTM) Systems, UTM flight demonstrations, use cases identified by UAS operators, and relevant information 
obtained from the FAA and NTSB.  Hazards-based test scenarios will be developed with traceability to the current 
and future hazards as described in Section IV.  Risk modeling and analyses will utilize trajectory prediction models 
developed for off-nominal conditions (including LOC hazards).  Monte Carlo simulation techniques will be utilized 
to characterize impact point predictions under nominal and off-nominal conditions, various levels of urban 
development, and various levels of NAS usage.  Probabilistic risk models are also being considered for evaluating the 
effectiveness of contingency management strategies at the UTM system as well as the vehicle level.  Flight testing 
will be performed to introduce safety risks and evaluate the effectiveness of contingency responses.  Safety cases will 
be developed at various levels of UTM system development, including in support of flight demonstrations, for 
assessing UTM software, and more broadly for UAS operation in the NAS.  A level of confidence assessment will 
provide a measure of the level of confidence associated with the UAS safety case to be developed.   
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
This paper presented an analysis approach to evaluate LOC accidents and incidents for the purpose of developing 
technology solutions that enable LOC prevention and recovery under a wide spectrum of relevant hazards.  The 
analysis approach identifies precursor / hazards sequences, worst case hazards combinations, and key attributes (e.g., 
crew distraction and human-machine interface issues) associated with each LOC accident or incident.  This analysis 
process was illustrated for eight accidents and incidents (from a defined set of accidents and incidents over a recent 
15-year period) involving blocked pitot tube or static ports.  Five of these mishaps were fatal accidents, and the 
remaining three mishaps were non-fatal incidents.  The analysis developed precursor sequences and hazards 
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combinations to compare and contrast the fatal with the non-fatal mishaps.  An evaluation of the precursor sequences 
included a number of observations, including the initiating event (3/8 started from an “Improper Maintenance Action 
/ Inaction,” 4/8 were initiated from pitot tube icing, and 1/8 was undetermined) and common features of the fatal and 
non-fatal mishaps.  The fatal accidents had the following key features:  1.) 3/5 were characterized by “Improper / 
Ineffective Recovery;”  2.) 5/5 experienced a serious vehicle upset condition, with 4/5 involving a “Stall / Departure,” 
and 1/5 entering into an “Uncontrolled Descent;”  3.) 3/5 involved flight deck instrumentation and/or auto-flight 
system issues (e.g., operational errors or inadequacies);  and 4.) 4/5 cases also involved “Loss of Awareness” by the 
crew associated with the aircraft / system, energy, or attitude state.  The non-fatal incidents involved vehicle upsets, 
but only one entered into a stall.  Only one non-fatal incident involved “Loss of Awareness.”  There were still pilot 
issues for the non-fatal incidents, but these involved fewer occurrences and varieties of crew error.   
In general, the fatal accidents appear to be more complicated (i.e., involving more precursors and precursor 
combinations) than the nonfatal incidents.  A comparison of event complexity was performed by analyzing the worst 
case precursor combinations using 3-D scatter plots.  The  fatal accidents involved numerous multiple hazards 
combinations, and the non-fatal incidents were clearly less complex.  Comments and flags identifying key attributes 
of each mishaps were also evaluated.  In three of the five fatal accidents, the crew was distracted or overwhelmed by 
conditions related to the pitot system failure (with one of these accidents exacerbated by the presence of cabin crew 
in the cockpit).  Four of the five fatal accidents involved potential human-machine interface issues, with the accident 
report for the fifth accident not having enough information to make this determination.  In some cases the auto-flight 
system flew the aircraft into stall (due to the erroneous airspeed indications), and flight deck instrumentation provided 
little information for improved situation awareness and no guidance on appropriate actions to take.  Moreover, in some 
instances multiple conflicting warnings and alerts were sounding simultaneously – which further confused the crew.  
By comparison, none of the non-fatal incidents involved crew distraction.  Although the onboard systems provided 
similar opportunities for confusion or to further exacerbate the situation, the comparatively less complex hazards 
profile enabled the pilots to successfully recover to a safe flight condition. 
Comparing the fatal and nonfatal mishaps of this study, it can be concluded that there is a level of hazards 
complexity at which pilots (or any human) become confused and are unable to respond effectively.  Moreover, current 
systems are essentially designed for nominal conditions and either disengage or respond inappropriately (adding 
additional confusion and complexity to the situation).  Some potential mitigation strategies to prevent these kinds of 
mishaps in the future include:  1.) Improved pilot training relative to diagnosing and mitigating onboard system failures 
(including sensor system failures and use of alternate instrumentation);  2.) Improved crew training under unexpected 
and abnormal conditions (including multiple hazards events) and in the implications of existing protections associated 
with system operational modes;  3.) Sensor integrity management system capable of detecting, identifying and 
mitigating sensor system failures (including blocked pitot tube or static ports and common mode sensor failures);  4.) 
Improved algorithms and displays that provide improved situational awareness to the systems and crew under multiple 
hazards conditions;  5.) Resilient flight control system capable of ensuring flight safety under multiple hazards 
(including system failures, external disturbances, and inappropriate control inputs by the crew and/or autoflight 
systems); and  6.) Resilient upset recovery system capable of providing guidance for and/or automatic recovery from 
upset conditions (including stall) under multiple hazards conditions. 
Percent occurrences of individual hazards were also summarized for the 122 mishaps analyzed to date from the set 
of 278 mishaps.  Hazards related to Vehicle Upsets associated with uncontrolled descent and stall / departure have 
occurred in 34% and 30% of the mishaps analyzed thus far.  Hazards related to Adverse Onboard Conditions include 
Vehicle Impairment (with airframe structural damage dominating at 25%), System & Component Failures (fairly 
evenly distributed at 10-15% across six of the seven hazards contained therein), and Crew Action / Inaction (with loss 
of attitude state awareness, improper procedure, inadequate crew resource monitoring / management, ineffective 
recovery, and loss of energy state awareness all occurring most often ranging from 17% to 27%). 
Further  work will include the identification of future potential LOC hazards and the development of hazards-based 
test scenarios for the resilience evaluation of future semi-autonomous and autonomous systems developed for LOC 
prevention and recovery.    This work is highly relevant to UAS and their safe operation in the NAS.  An approach for 
assessing UAS safety and risk was also discussed.     
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Appendix A:  Accident / Incident Set 
 
 
No  Date Aircraft Registr'n Ident Loc'n Light  Wea Fat  Dam   Phase Occurrence Result 
1 1/7/1996 DC-9 N--922VV VJA 558 KBNA D V 0 S Landing Uncommanded Spoiler Extension Hard Landing 
2 2/6/1996 B-757 TC-GEN ALW 301 MDPP N U 189 D Climb Instrument Failure Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
3 2/12/1996 GAF-24 N-224E N-224E MTPP D V 10 D Initial climb Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
4 2/19/1996 CE-550 D-CASH PWF ASH U U 10 D Approach Icing Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
5 2/22/1996 MD-11 B-152 CAL 4 RCTP U U 0 U Initial climb Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO) Upset 
6 5/11/1996 DC-9 N-904VJ VJA 592 KMIA D V 110 D Climb Structural Failure - Fire/Explosion Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
7 6/5/1996 MD-80 N-224AA AAL 873 KABQ D V 0 M Landing Atmospheric Disturbance Hard Landing 
8 6/9/1996 B-737 N-221US EW09 51 KRIC N V 0 N Approach Uncommanded Bank Upset 
9 6/14/1996 A-320 N-347NW NWA 395 KBOS D V 0 N Climb Flight Control System Uncommanded Pitch 
10 6/21/1996 A-340 D-AIBE DLH 436 KDFW U U 0 U Climb Unexpected Control Gains Cabin Injuries 
11 7/13/1996 MD-11 N-1768D AAL 68D D V 0 N Descent Attempt To Override Autopilot Cabin Injuries 
12 7/17/1996 B-747 N-93119 TWA 800 KJFK T V 230 D Climb Structural Failure - Fire/Explosion Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
13 7/20/1996 DC-6 N-313RS NAC 33 PARS D V 4 D Cruise Structural Failure - Fire/Explosion Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
14 10/2/1996 B-757 N-52AW PLI 603 N I 70 D Climb Spatial Disorientation Collision W/Terrain 
15 10/22/1996 B-707 N-751MA MIRA 1M SEMT U U 4 D Climb Stall Collision W/Obstacle 
16 10/31/1996 FO-100 PT-MRK TAM 402 SBSP D V 96 D Initial climb Asymmetric Thrust/Drag Collision W/Obstacle 
17 11/7/1996 B-727 5N-BBG ADK 86 U U 144 D Approach Aggressive Maneuver Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
18 11/12/1996 B-747 HZ-AIH SVA 763 U U 312 D Climb Structural Failure - Midair Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
19 11/12/1996 Il-76 UN-76435 KZA 1907 U U 37 D Descent Structural Failure - Midair Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
20 12/9/1996 DC-3 N-75142 D7T 142 KBOI N V 2 D Initial climb Stall Collision W/Terrain 
21 12/10/1996 An-74 RA-74037 VSA 037 UERR N U 0 D Initial climb Thrust Reverse-Unwanted Collision W/Terrain 
22 12/21/1996 An-32 HK-4008X SDV 08X SKRG N U 4 D Approach Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
23 1/9/1997 E-120 N-265CA COM 327 KDTW D I 29 D Descent Icing Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
24 1/25/1997 Il-76 RA-76834 VSO 834 UHMA U U 0 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Collision W/Terrain 
25 2/1/1997 HS-748 6V-AEO DS AEO GOTT U U 23 D Initial climb Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
26 3/2/1997 BE-200 N-117WM N-117WM KSLC T I 1 S Final approach - prec Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
27 3/14/1997 F-27 D2-TFP DTA TFP FCBB U U 3 D Initial climb Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
28 4/14/1997 An-24 RA-46516 RA-46516 D U 50 D Cruise Structural Failure - Fatigue Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
29 4/19/1997 BAE-ATP PK-MTX MNA 106 WIOD N U 15 D Approach Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
30 5/8/1997 B-737 B-2925 CSN 3456 ZGSZ N I 35 D Landing Atmospheric Disturbance Hard Landing 
31 5/12/1997 A-300 N-90070 AAL 903 KPBI D I 0 M Level off from desce Stall Upset 
32 5/20/1997 AC-1121 N-1121F N-1121F D I 4 D Cruise Atmospheric Disturbance Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
33 6/8/1997 MD-11 JA-8580 JAL 706 RJNA D U 0 M Descent Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO) Upset 
34 7/3/1997 F-27 VT-SSA LBE SSA VABB N I 2 D Initial climb Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
35 7/12/1997 DC-9 N-9138 NWA 944 KMEM D V 0 M Landing Flight Controls Upset 
36 8/7/1997 DC-8 N-27UA FBF 101 KMIA D V 4 D Initial climb Load - C/G Out Of Range Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
37 10/10/1997 DC-9 LV-WEG AUT 2553 N I 75 D Descent Structural Failure - Exceeded Limit Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
38 12/13/1997 SA-226 CP-1635 SAVE 635 SLVT U U 10 D Initial climb Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
39 12/16/1997 CL-600 C-FSKI ACA 646 CYFC N I 0 D Go-around Stall Collision W/Terrain 
40 2/16/1998 A-300 B-1814 CAL 676 RCTP N I 196 D Missed approach Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
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No  Date Aircraft Registr'n Ident Loc'n Light  Wea Fat  Dam   Phase Occurrence Result 
41 3/18/1998 SF-340 B-12255 FOS 255 RCPO N I 13 D Climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
42 5/21/1998 DC-10 N-68043 COA 75 KLAX D V 0 M Climb Autopilot Uncommanded Pitch 
43 6/18/1998 SA-226 C-GQAL PRO 420 CYUL D U 11 D Climb Structural Failure - Fire/Explosion Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
44 7/23/1998 An-12 RA-11886 RA-11886 ULLP D U 0 D Initial climb Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Collision W/Terrain 
45 7/28/1998 SA-227 EC-FXD SWT 704 LEBL N V 2 D Approach Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
46 7/30/1998 Do-228 VT-EJW LLR EJW VOCC D V 6 D Initial climb Flight Control Actuator Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
47 7/30/1998 BE-1900 F-GSJM PRB 706 D V 14 D Approach Structural Failure - Midair Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
48 8/24/1998 DC-3 ZS-NKK SPZ NKK FAWB D V 1 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Mis-set Trim Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
49 9/2/1998 MD-11 HB-IWF SWR 111 CYHZ N U 229 D Cruise Loss Of All Attitude Displays Collision W/Terrain 
50 10/17/1998 BE-99 N-299GL TIMA 501 KMSO N V 0 S Go-around Failure To Maintain Airspeed Collision W/Terrain 
51 10/18/1998 A-320 EI-TLI TRZ TLI EIDW U U 0 M Approach Jammed Flight Controls Upset 
52 10/21/1998 E-120 PT-WKH PT-WKH SBFZ D U 3 D Approach Improper Control Operation Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
53 11/11/1998 SF-340 VH-LPI KDA LPI YMML D I 0 N holding (IFR) Icing Stall Upset 
54 12/2/1998 CE-501 N-501EZ N-501EZ D V 1 D Cruise Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
55 12/4/1998 An-12 LZ-SFG LXR SFG LPLA N U 7 D Initial climb Asymmetric Thrust/Drag Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
56 12/11/1998 A-310 HS-TIA TIA 261 VSSB N I 101 D Missed approach Somatogravic Illusion Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
57 1/12/1999 F-27 G-CHNL EXS HNL EGJB U U 2 D Approach Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
58 1/28/1999 LR-35 N-130F USC 251 KMD N V 0 S Landing Unstabilized Approach Hard Landing 
59 2/2/1999 An-12 EY-ASS FDN ASS FNLU N U 11 D Initial climb Undetermined Collision W/Obstacle 
60 2/24/1999 Tu-154 B-2622 CSW 450 ZSWZ U U 61 D Approach Flight Control Disconnected Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
61 4/5/1999 DHC-6 N-838MA DCC 8MA KLNA D V 0 S Approach Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Collision W/Terrain 
62 4/7/1999 B-737 TC-JEP THY 5904 LTAF N I 6 D Climb Instrument Failure Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
63 4/15/1999 MD-11 HL-7373 KAL 6316 ZSSS D U 3 D Climb Spatial Disorientation Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
64 8/31/1999 B-737 LV-WRZ LPR 3142 SABE N U 63 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
65 9/2/1999 B-737 N-371UA UAL 2036 D V 0 M Cruise Wake Turbulence Cabin Injuries 
66 9/14/1999 DA-900 SX-ECH OAL 3838 LROP U U 7 S Descent Attempt To Override Autopilot Upset 
67 9/24/1999 A-320 C-FKCO ACA 630 CYSJ N V 0 M Landing Flight Controls Mode Change Landed Short 
68 10/9/1999 DA-900 N-523AC N-523AC KGRR U U 0 U Descent Attempt To Override Autopilot Aircraft Pitch/Roll Oscillations 
69 10/18/1999 SF-340 SE-LES GAO 750 ENSN N I 0 M Climb Stall Upset 
70 10/25/1999 LR-35 N-47BA SJ8 7BA U U 6 D Climb Incapacitation: Hypoxia Spiral Dive Into Ground 
71 11/9/1999 DC-9 XA-TKN TEJ 725 MMPN N U 18 D Climb Spatial Disorientation Collision W/Terrain 
72 12/5/1999 Il-114 UK-91004 CTB 004 UUDD U U 5 D Initial climb Jammed Flight Controls Collision W/Obstacle 
73 12/12/1999 IAI-1124 N-50PL N-50PL D V 3 D Descent Flight Control Disconnected Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
74 12/22/1999 B-747 HL-7451 KAL 8509 EGSS N U 4 D Climb Spatial Disorientation Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
75 1/5/2000 E-110 5N-AXL EAN AXL DNAA U U 1 D Approach Stall Collision W/Terrain 
76 1/10/2000 SF-340 HB-AKK CRX 498 LSZH N I 10 D Initial climb Spatial Disorientation Spiral Dive Into Ground 
77 1/30/2000 A-310 5Y-BEN KQA 431 DIAP N V 169 D Initial climb Stall Collision W/Terrain 
78 1/31/2000 MD-80 N-963AS ASA 261 D V 88 D Cruise Jammed Flight Controls Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
79 2/16/2000 DC-8 N-8079U EWW 17 KMHR N V 3 D Initial climb Flight Control Disconnected Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
80 2/27/2000 B-747 G-BDXL BAW 179 N I 0 N Descent Uncommanded Pitch Upset 
81 3/9/2000 Yak-40 RA-88170 VGV 170 UUEE D U 9 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Contaminated Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
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82 3/17/2000 DC-3 C-FNTF PTSN NT CYJC U U 2 D Go-around Load - C/G Out Of Range Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
83 3/30/2000 B-767 N-182DN DAL 106 KJFK N I 0 N Climb Spatial Disorientation Upset 
84 5/2/2000 LR-35 G-MURI NEX 4B LFLL U U 2 D Landing Engine Failure Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
85 5/21/2000 JS-3101 N-16EJ ORA 6EJ KAVP D I 19 D Approach Directional Control Not Maintained Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
86 6/22/2000 Y-7 B-3479 CWU 343 ZHHH D I 42 D Approach Wind Shear Collision W/Obstacle 
87 6/23/2000 LR-55 N-220JC UJT 0JC KBCT D V 3 D Climb Structural Failure - Midair Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
88 6/27/2000 A-300 N-14065 AAL 065 EGLL D V 0 N Climb Wake Turbulence Landed Without Further Incident 
89 7/17/2000 B-737 VT-EGD LLR 7412 VEPT D M 55 D Approach Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
90 7/19/2000 G-159 C-GNAK AWV 980 N I 2 D Cruise Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
91 7/20/2000 DC-3 N-54AA N-54AA MYNN D V 2 D Initial climb Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
92 7/25/2000 AS-100 F-BTSC AFR 4590 LFPG D V 109 D Initial climb Structural Failure - Fire/Explosion Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
93 8/23/2000 A-320 A4-OEK GFA 72 OBBI N V 143 D Missed approach Somatogravic Illusion Collision W/Terrain 
94 8/31/2000 An-26 D2-FDI NCL FDI FNSA U U 44 D Cruise Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
95 10/2/2000 A-340 TC-JDN THY JDN U U 0 N Cruise Flight Controls Mode Change Altitude Deviation 
96 10/26/2000 CL-600 N-958CA COM 8CA D V 0 N Cruise Wake Turbulence Upset 
97 11/1/2000 DHC-6 C-GGAW YWZ 151 CYHC D U 0 D Initial climb Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Collision W/Terrain 
98 11/9/2000 SA-226 N-731AC ETA4 100 KFWA N I 1 D Initial climb Instrument Failure Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
99 11/15/2000 An-24 D2-FCG API FCG FNLU D U 57 D Initial climb Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Collision W/Terrain 
100 11/25/2000 MD-11 N-582FE FDE 3015 KEWR D V 0 N Climb Flight Controls Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO) 
101 12/2/2000 LR-35 C-GDJH C-GDJH CYVR U U 0 N Climb Jammed Flight Controls Uncommanded Bank 
102 12/27/2000 E-135 N-721HS EGF 230 KORD N V 0 N Initial climb Jammed Flight Controls Upset 
103 1/25/2001 DC-3 YV-224C RUC 225 SVCB D U 24 D Approach Unknown Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
104 1/27/2001 BE-200 N-81PF JEK 1PF T I 10 D Cruise Instrument Failure Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
105 2/7/2001 A-320 EC-HKJ IBE 1456 LEBB N V 0 D Landing Unexpected Control Gains Hard Landing 
106 2/8/2001 LR-35 I-MOCO I-MOCO EDDN D V 3 D Approach Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
107 3/17/2001 A-320 N-357NW NWA 985 KDTW N I 0 S Initial climb Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO) Collision W/Terrain 
108 3/19/2001 E-120 N-266CA COM 505 KPBA D I 0 S Descent Icing Stall Upset 
109 3/20/2001 A-320 D-AIPW DLH IPW EDFF U U 0 N Initial climb Reversed Controls Uncommanded Bank 
110 3/24/2001 DHC-6 F-OGES ISB 1501 TFFJ D V 19 D Final approach - non Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
111 4/2/2001 CE-501 N-405PC N-405PC KGRB D I 1 D Climb Spatial Disorientation Collision W/Obstacle 
112 5/25/2001 A-340 F-GLZC AFR 3682 SOCA D V 0 M Landing Atmospheric Disturbance Landed Short 
113 7/4/2001 Tu-154 RA-85845 VLK 352 N I 145 D Approach Autopilot-Induced Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
114 8/9/2001 BE-200 N-899RW N-899RW KOKZ D I 0 D Approach Stall Collision W/Terrain 
115 8/24/2001 LR-25 N-153TW AJI 3TW KITH N I 2 D Initial climb Somatogravic Illusion Collision W/Terrain 
116 9/12/2001 Let-410 XA-ACM XA-ACM MMCT D V 19 D Initial climb Failure To Maintain Control Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
117 9/14/2001 BE-1900 C-GSKC SKK 621 CYYT N I 0 D Initial climb Uncommanded Pitch Forced Landing 
118 9/18/2001 Let-410 TG-CFE TG-CFE MGGT U U 8 D Initial climb Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
119 10/4/2001 Tu-154 RA-85693 SBI 1812 D U 78 D Cruise Hostile Action Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
120 10/10/2001 SA-226 EC-GDV FTL 101 D I 10 D Cruise Loss Of All Attitude Displays Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
121 10/16/2001 E-145 N-825MJ ASH 5733 KROA N V 0 S Landing Stall Hard Landing 
122 11/12/2001 A-300 N-14053 AAL 587 KJFK D V 260 D Climb Wake Turbulence In-flight Breakup 
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123 11/19/2001 Il-18 RA-75840 LDF 840   U U 27 D Cruise Flight Control System Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
124 11/22/2001 LR-25 N-5UJ UJT 5UJ KPIT D V 2 D Initial climb Overcontrol Collision W/Terrain 
125 12/10/2001 LR-24 N-997TD X5CA 36 N V 2 D Descent Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
126 12/14/2001 DC-8 N-825BX RTI 8101 PANC N V 0 N Initial climb Flight Control Hardover Uncommanded Bank 
127 12/20/2001 CE-560 HB-VLV EGU 220 LSZH N I 2 D Initial climb Somatogravic Illusion Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
128 1/4/2002 CL-600 N-90AG N-90AG EGBB D V 5 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Contaminated Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
129 1/22/2002 B-757 TF-FIO ICE 315 ENGM D I 0 N Go-around Somatogravic Illusion Upset 
130 4/12/2002 SA-227 EC-GKR TDC GKR LEPA N U 2 D Approach Aggressive Maneuver Collision W/Terrain 
131 5/4/2002 BAC-111 5N-ESF EXW 422 KNKN D U 71 D Cruise Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
132 5/25/2002 B-747 B-18255 CAL 611 D U 225 D Cruise Structural Failure - Fatigue Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
133 6/3/2002 MD-11 N-588FE FEX 5181 N I 0 S Descent Overcontrol Structural Failure 
134 6/4/2002 MD-80 N-823NK NKS 970 D V 0 N Cruise Autopilot-Induced Stall Upset 
135 6/14/2002 A-330 C-GHLM ACA 875 EDDF U U 0 N Approach Flight Control Logic Uncommanded Pitch 
136 6/28/2002 SF-340 VH-OLM HZL 185 YBTH N U 0 N Approach Icing Stall Upset 
137 7/1/2002 Tu-154 RA-85816 BTC 2937 N U 69 D Cruise Structural Failure - Midair Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
138 7/1/2002 B-757 A9-CDHL DHL 611 N U 2 D Cruise Structural Failure - Midair Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
139 7/28/2002 Il-86 RA-86060 PLK 060 UUEE D U 14 D Initial climb Runaway Pitch Trim Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
140 8/14/2002 ATR-42 PT-MTS TTL 5561 N U 2 D Cruise Runaway Pitch Trim Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
141 10/9/2002 B-747 N-661US NWA 85 PANC N V 0 M Cruise Flight Control Hardover Uncommanded Bank 
142 10/20/2002 B-757 TF-FII ICE 662 KBWI N U 0 N Climb Spatial Disorientation Upset 
143 11/8/2002 IAI-1124 N-61RS BQVA 1R KSKX D V 2 D Approach Atmospheric Disturbance Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
144 12/3/2002 A-300 Unknown Unknown EDDM D U 0 N Climb Controls (Trim) Design Airspeed Exceeded (Vne/Vmo) 
145 12/7/2002 A-320 C-GIUF ACA 1130 CYYZ U U 0 N Final approach - prec Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO) Go Around 
146 12/7/2002 A-320 C-GJVX ACA 457 CYYZ U U 0 N Final approach - prec Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO) Hard Landing 
147 12/21/2002 ATR-72 B-22708 TNA 791 N I 2 D Descent Icing Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
148 12/27/2002 Let-410 9X-RRB 9X-RRB FMCV D I 1 D Missed approach Spatial Disorientation Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
149 1/8/2003 BE-1900 N2-33YV AMW 548 KCLT D V 21 D Initial climb Flight Control Integrity Lost Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
150 2/10/2003 An-28 ES-NOY ENI 827 EETN N I 2 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Contaminated Collision W/Obstacle 
151 3/6/2003 B-737 7T-VEZ DAH 6289 DAAT D U 102 D Initial climb Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
152 4/23/2003 BE-99 C-FDYF ABS DYF CYPA D U 0 D Approach Flight Control Actuator Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
153 5/1/2003 LR-45 I-ERJC I-ERJC ASN U U 2 D Initial climb Structural Failure - Birdstrike Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
154 6/16/2003 A-320 C-GTDK SSV TDK EGGD U U 0 S Landing Unexpected Control Gains Hard Landing 
155 7/8/2003 B-737 ST-AFK SUD 139 HSSP N U 116 D Missed approach Failure To Maintain Control Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
156 8/4/2003 LR-35 N-135PT RM6A 5P KGON D V 2 D Approach Inadvertent Control Input Collision W/Obstacle 
157 8/24/2003 Let-410 HH-PRV HH-PRV MTCH N U 21 D Circling approach Failure To Maintain Control Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
158 8/26/2003 BE-1900 N-240CJ CJC 9446 KHYA D V 2 D Initial climb Reversed Controls Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
159 10/3/2003 CV-580 ZK-KFU AFN 642 N I 2 D Descent Icing Stall In-flight Breakup 
160 10/26/2003 FH-227 LV-MGV CTZ 760 N U 5 D Cruise Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
161 11/22/2003 A-300 OO-DLL BCS DLL ORBS D V 0 S Climb Hostile Action Runway Departure 
162 12/23/2003 LR-24 N-600XJ N-600XJ D V 2 D Climb Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
163 1/3/2004 B-737 SU-ZCF FLS 604 HESH N V 148 D Climb Spatial Disorientation Spiral Dive Into Ground 
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164 2/10/2004 FO-50 E-PLCA IRK 7170 OMSI D U 43 D Final approach - non Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
165 3/4/2004 Il-76 UR-ZVA AZV ZVA UBBB U U 3 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
166 3/19/2004 LR-35 N-800AW BSYA 0A KUCA U I 0 S Go-around Stall Hard Landing 
167 5/5/2004 SA-227 HK-4275X HK-4275X SKLC D V 5 D VFR pattern-final Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
168 5/6/2004 Let-410 9X-REF 9X-REF D U 6 D Initial climb Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
169 5/17/2004 DHC-6 8Q-TMC TMW TM VRMM D U 0 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Collision W/Obstacle 
170 5/18/2004 Il-76 4KAZ27 AHC Z27 ZWW D U 7 D Initial climb Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
171 6/18/2004 SF-340 VH-KEQ REX KEQ YMML D I 0 U Descent Stall Upset 
172 7/2/2004 IAI-1124 N-280AT N-280AT MPTO D U 6 D Initial climb Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
173 7/21/2004 DC-9 XA-BCS SER 706 MMMX U U 0 D Initial climb Wind Shear Collision W/Terrain 
174 8/11/2004 B-737 3X-GCM GIB GCM GFLL U U 0 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Collision W/Terrain 
175 10/5/2004 An-12 ST-SAF SRW SAF D U 4 D Cruise Failure To Maintain Control Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
176 10/14/2004 B-747 9G-MKJ MKA 1602 CYHZ N U 7 D Initial climb Stall Collision W/Terrain 
177 10/14/2004 CL-600 N-8396A FLG 3701 KJEF N V 2 D Cruise Autopilot-Induced Stall Collision W/Terrain 
178 11/21/2004 CL-600 B-3072 CES 5210 ZBOW D U 53 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Contaminated Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
179 11/28/2004 CL-600 N-873G YQCA 73 KMTJ D I 3 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Contaminated Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
180 11/30/2004 HFB-320 N-604GA GAE 4GA KSUS N I 2 D Initial climb Controls (Trim) Collision W/Terrain 
181 12/10/2004 BE-200 N-648KA YSDA 8K TS94 D V 0 D Initial climb Stall Collision W/Obstacle 
182 1/13/2005 E-110 N-49BA RLR 2352 KEEN N I 1 D Missed approach Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
183 2/16/2005 CE-560 N-500AT N-500AT KPUB D I 8 D Final approach - prec Icing Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
184 2/24/2005 IAI-1124 XC-COL XC-COL D U 7 D Approach Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
185 3/15/2005 An-26 OB-1778P AMP 78P SPIM D U 0 S Initial climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Collision W/Terrain 
186 3/26/2005 Let-410 HK-4146 WCW 99 SKPV D U 9 D Initial climb Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
187 5/2/2005 SA-227 ZK-POA AWK 23 N I 2 D Cruise Load - C/G Out Of Range Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
188 5/12/2005 MD-90 N-10ME MEP 490 KIRK N I 0 N Cruise Instrument Failure Aircraft Pitch/Roll Oscillations 
189 5/21/2005 CL-600 N-699CW DGFA 9C KAGS N V 0 N Climb Aggressive Maneuver Cabin Injuries 
190 5/27/2005 DHC-8 C-GZKH C-GZKH CYYT D I 0 N Climb Icing Stall Upset 
191 8/1/2005 B-777 9M-MRG MAS 124 YPPH U U 0 N Climb Uncommanded Pitch Upset 
192 8/14/2005 B-737 5B-DBY HCY 522 LGAV U U 121 D Climb Incapacitation: Hypoxia Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
193 8/16/2005 MD-80 HK-4374X WCW 70 N U 160 D Cruise Autopilot-Induced Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
194 9/5/2005 B-737 PR-BRY BRB 907 U U 0 U Cruise Uncommanded Bank Upset 
195 9/5/2005 B-737 PK-RIM MDL 91 WIMM U U 100 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Collision W/Obstacle 
196 9/30/2005 B-737 D-ABEA DLH BEA EDDF U U 0 N Approach Wake Turbulence Landed Without Further Incident 
197 10/3/2005 E-170 N-650RW UHL 7621 KIAD D V 0 N Approach Aggressive Maneuver Cabin Injuries 
198 10/22/2005 B-737 5N-BFN BVU 210 N U 117 D Climb Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
199 11/5/2005 A-320 OO-TCX TCW TC EDDF U V 0 N Approach Wake Turbulence Landed Without Further Incident 
200 11/8/2005 E-110 N-7801Q BQTA 35 KMHT D V 0 D Initial climb Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Collision W/Obstacle 
201 12/19/2005 G-73 N-2969 CHK 101 KMPB D V 20 D Initial climb Structural Failure - Fatigue Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
202 12/23/2005 An-140 4K-AZ48 AHY 217 N I 23 D Cruise Loss Of All Attitude Displays Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
203 12/28/2005 LR-35 N-781RS S2KA 1R KTRK D I 2 D Approach Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
204 1/2/2006 SF-340 N-390AE SIM 3008   D I 0 N Climb Icing Stall Upset 
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205 1/5/2006 CE-560 N-391QS DXTA 1Q KARV D V 0 S Landing Stall Collision W/Obstacle 
206 2/8/2006 SA-226 N-629EK GAE 9EK D V 1 D Cruise Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
207 2/9/2006 CL-600 N-900LG N-900LG KASE D V 0 S Approach Wake Turbulence Hard Landing 
208 5/3/2006 A-320 EK-32009 RNV 967 URSS N I 113 D Missed approach Spatial Disorientation Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
209 6/21/2006 DHC-6 9N-AEQ NYT AEQ VNJL U U 9 D Go-around Aggressive Maneuver Collision W/Terrain 
210 7/10/2006 F-27 AP-BAL PIA 688 OPMT D U 45 D Initial climb Stall Collision W/Terrain 
211 8/13/2006 L-387 7T-VHG DAH 2208 U U 3 D Cruise Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
212 8/22/2006 Tu-154 RA-85185 PLK 612 D I 170 D Cruise Turbulence Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
213 9/29/2006 B-737 PR-GTD GLO 1907 D V 154 D Cruise Structural Failure - Midair Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
214 9/29/2006 E-135 N-600XL N-600XL SBCC D V 0 S Cruise Structural Failure - Midair Forced Landing 
215 10/23/2006 A-320 N-924FR FFT 539 KDEN D V 0 N Landing Inadvertent Control Input Uncommanded Pitch 
216 10/29/2006 B-737 5N-BFK ADK 53 DNAA D I 96 D Initial climb Wind Shear Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
217 10/31/2006 CL-600 N-322FX N-322FX KTEB U V 0 N Approach Aggressive Maneuver Cabin Injuries 
218 11/30/2006 NA-265 XA-TNP FCS TNP MMCL U U 2 D Landing Undetermined Collision W/Obstacle 
219 1/1/2007 B-737 PK-KKW DHI 574 D U 102 D Cruise Spatial Disorientation Spiral Dive Into Ground 
220 1/10/2007 LR-35 N-40AN N-40AN KCMH N V 0 S Cruise Intentional Acrobatics Exceeded Design Loads 
221 1/12/2007 CE-525 N-77215 SQ6R 215 KVNY D V 2 D Initial climb Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
222 1/25/2007 FO-100 F-GMPG RAE 7775 LFBP D V 0 S Initial climb Attempted TO W/Contaminated Collision W/Obstacle 
223 2/13/2007 CL-600 N-168CK N-168CK UUW U I 0 D Initial climb Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
224 3/17/2007 CE-500 N-511AT N-511AT KBVY D I 0 S Landing Contaminated Airfoil Collision W/Terrain 
225 3/27/2007 E-170 HZ-AEN SVA 1866 OERK U U 0 U Descent Undetermined Uncommanded Pitch 
226 5/5/2007 B-737 5Y-KYA KQA 507 FKKD N U 114 D Initial climb Spatial Disorientation Spiral Dive Into Ground 
227 5/17/2007 Let-410 TN-AHE SAFE AH U U 3 D Initial climb Undetermined Collision W/Obstacle 
228 6/4/2007 CE-550 N-550BP DJQ 0BP KMKE D V 6 D Climb Spatial Disorientation Spiral Dive Into Ground 
229 7/29/2007 An-12 RA-93912 VAS 9655 UUDD N U 7 D Initial climb Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
230 8/9/2007 DHC-6 F-OIQI TAH 1121 NTTM D V 20 D Initial climb Flight Control Integrity Lost Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
231 9/23/2007 B-737 G-THOF TOM HOF EGHH N I 0 N Final approach - prec Stall Uncommanded Pitch 
232 10/17/2007 LR-35 N-31MC N-31MC KGLD D I 0 S Landing Aircraft Pitch/Roll Oscillations Collision W/Terrain 
233 11/4/2007 LR-35 PT-OVC PT-OVC SBMT U U 2 D Initial climb Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
234 12/10/2007 BE-200 N-925TT N-925TT KSMN W I 2 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Contaminated Collision W/Obstacle 
235 12/16/2007 CL-600 N-470ZW AWI 3758 KPVD D I 0 S Landing Stall Hard Landing 
236 1/10/2008 A-320 C-GBHZ ACA 190 KOMK N V 0 M Climb Wake Turbulence Upset 
237 2/14/2008 CL-600 EW-101PJ BRU 1834 UDYZ U U 0 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Contaminated Collision W/Terrain 
238 3/4/2008 CE-500 N-113SH N-113SH KPWA D U 5 D Climb Structural Failure - Birdstrike Collision W/Terrain 
239 4/9/2008 SA-227 VH-OZA VH-OZA YSSY N V 1 D Climb Spatial Disorientation Spiral Dive Into Ground 
240 5/23/2008 BE-1900 N-195GA TIM 5008 KBIL N I 1 D Initial climb Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
241 5/26/2008 An-12 RA12957 GAI 2063 USCC U U 9 D Climb Flight Control Integrity Lost Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
242 6/14/2008 MD-10 N-554FE FDE 764 U V 0 S holding (IFR) Stall Exceeded Design Loads 
243 6/18/2008 DHC-6 N-656WA WIG 6601 KHYA D V 1 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Gust Locks Eng Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
244 6/30/2008 Il-76 ST-WTB BBE 700 HSSS D U 4 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Collision W/Terrain 
245 7/10/2008 BE-99 CC-CFM CC-CFM SCPF U U 9 D Initial climb Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
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246 7/16/2008 DHC-6 C-GBEB NWI BEB D V 0 S VFR pattern-base tur Stall Collision W/Obstacle 
247 8/20/2008 MD-80 EC-HFP JKK 5022 LEMD U U 154 D Initial climb Attempted TO W/Incorrect Config Collision W/Terrain 
248 9/14/2008 B-737 VP-BKO AFL BKO USPP N I 88 D Approach Spatial Disorientation Spiral Dive Into Ground 
249 10/7/2008 A-330 VH-QPA QFA 72 YPLM U U 0 M Cruise Flight Control Logic Upset 
250 11/1/2008 CASA-212 N-437RA ATS 7RA T V 0 S Go-around Asymmetric Thrust/Drag Collision W/Terrain 
251 11/4/2008 LR-45 XC-VMC XC-VMC MMMX U U 9 U Approach Wake Turbulence Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
252 12/7/2008 LR-23 XC-LGD XC-LGD U U 2 D Go-around Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
253 1/27/2009 ATR-42 N-902FX CFS 8284 KLLB N I 0 S Final approach - prec Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
254 1/28/2009 B-757 G-STRZ AEU TRZ DGAA N I 0 N Cruise Instrument Failure Landed Without Further Incident 
255 2/7/2009 CE-650 I-FEEV AOE 301 U U 2 D Climb Undetermined Spiral Dive Into Ground 
256 2/7/2009 E-110 PT-SEA PT-SEA SWK D U 24 D Climb Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
257 2/12/2009 DHC-8 N-200WQ CJC 3407 KBUF N V 49 D Approach Stall Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
258 2/25/2009 B-737 TC-JGE THY 1951 EHAM D U 9 D Approach Stall Collision W/Terrain 
259 5/11/2009 B-747 G-BYGA BAW YG FAJS N V 0 N Initial climb Uncommanded Configuration Cha Stall Buffet 
260 6/1/2009 A-330 F-GZCP AFR 447 TASIL N I 228 D Cruise Spatial Disorientation Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
261 6/30/2009 A-310 7O-ADJ IYE 626 FMCH N V 152 D Circling approach Failure To Maintain Airspeed Collision W/Terrain 
262 7/15/2009 Tu-154 EP-CPG CMP 790 U U 168 D Cruise Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
263 10/21/2009 B-707 ST-AKW SUD 2241 OMSJ U U 6 D Initial climb Failure To Maintain Control Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
264 11/1/2009 Il-76 RF-76801 RF-76801 UERR U U 11 D Initial climb Undetermined Collision W/Terrain 
265 11/28/2009 MD-11 Z-BAV SMJ 324 ZSPD U U 3 D Initial climb Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
266 1/5/2010 LR-35 N-720RA RAX 988 KPWK D V 2 D Circling approach Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
267 1/6/2010 BE-99 N-206AV JIKA 6AV KEAR W I 0 S Landing Icing Stall Hard Landing 
268 1/21/2010 BE-1900 N-112AX AER 22 PASD N V 2 D Initial climb Undetermined Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
269 1/25/2010 B-737 ET-ANB ETH 409 OLBA N I 90 D Climb Spatial Disorientation Spiral Dive Into Ground 
270 2/13/2010 B-737 N-221WN SWA 253 KBUR D V 0 N Approach Aggressive Maneuver Cabin Injuries 
271 2/14/2010 CE-550 OK-ACH TIE 039C N V 2 D Cruise Intentional Acrobatics Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
272 5/12/2010 A-330 5A-ONG AAW 771 HLLT D I 103 D Go-around Somatogravic Illusion Collision W/Terrain 
273 8/25/2010 Let-410 9Q-CCN 9Q-CCN ZFBO U U 20 D Approach Load - C/G Out Of Range Collision W/Terrain 
274 9/3/2010 B-747 N-571UP UPS 006 OMDB N U 2 D Climb Structural Failure - Fire/Explosion Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
275 10/11/2010 A-380 F-HPJA AFR 006 KJFK D U 0 N Go-around Flap/Slat Extension Speed Exceed Altitude Deviation 
276 11/4/2010 ATR-72 CUT1549 CRN 883 U I 68 D Cruise Contaminated Airfoil Uncontrolled Descent to Ground/Water
277 11/5/2010 BE-1900 AP-BJD JSJ BJD OPKC U U 21 D Initial climb Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Collision W/Terrain 
278 11/28/2010 Il-76 4L-GNI 4L-GNI OPKC U U 8 D Initial climb Loss-of-Control (Vmc) Collision W/Obstacle 
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Appendix B:  LOC Accident Analysis Spreadsheet Illustration 
 
Example LOC Analysis Spreadsheet Entry:  Birgenair 301 (2/6/1996) 
 
The spreadsheet entries below illustrate the precursor analysis, comments, and potential for mitigation through research for Birgenair 301.  
 
 
 
 
 
Accident 
No.
Date Aircraft
Phase of 
Flight
Fatalities
Improper / 
Maintenance 
Action / 
Inaction 
and/or 
Inadequate 
Maintenance 
Procedure
Inappropriate 
Vehicle 
Configuration
Contaminated 
Airfoil
Smoke / Fire / 
Explosion
Improper 
Loading: 
Weight / 
Balance / CG 
Issues
Improper 
Loading: Cargo 
Problems / 
Hazards 
Airframe 
Structural 
Damage
Engine 
Damage 
(e.g., FOD) 
/ Engine 
Icing
System Operational 
Error / Inadequacy 
(Unexpected Design 
Characteristic / 
Validation Inadequacy 
/ Response to 
Erroneous Sensor 
Input)
System 
Operational 
Error 
(Software / 
Verification 
Error)
Control 
Component 
Failure / 
Malfunction
Engine Failure 
/ Malfunction
Sensor / 
Sensor 
System 
Failure / 
Malfunction
Flight Deck 
Instrumentation Failure 
/ Malfunction / 
Inadequacy (Includes 
Lack of Notification, 
False Warnings, 
Interface Issues, and 
Conflicting Information)
System / 
Subsystem 
Failure / 
Malfunction  
(Non‐control 
component)
2 2/6/1996 B‐757‐225 En Route 189 1 4 3 5
System  & Component Failures / Malfunctions / Inadequacy
None / 
Unknown
Adverse Onboard Conditions
Vehicle Impairment
cbelcast:
Pilot's air speed indicator (ASI) was not 
working properly and resulted in a falsely 
high ASI reading; Co-pilot's ASI seemed to 
be working; Incorrect ASI readings possibly 
caused by a blocked pitot tube (which was 
left uncovered for 3-4 days prior to this 
flight)
cbelcast:
Autopilot / Autothrottle 
inappropriately increased pitch-
up and reduced airspeed based 
on erroneous ASI of 350 kts 
(when actual ASI was 220 kts)
cbelcast:
"Rudder ratio" and "Mach 
Airspeed" advisory 
warnings were issued to 
crew while Co-pilot ASI 
read 200 kts decreasing; 
excessive speed warning 
was followed by stick 
shaker indicating imminent 
stall
cbelcast:
Pitot tubes were left 
uncovered for 3-4 days 
prior to the flight
Loss of 
Attitude State 
Awareness / 
Spatial 
Disorientation
Loss of Energy 
State 
Awareness / 
Inadequate 
Energy 
Management
Lack of 
Aircraft / 
System State 
Awareness / 
Mode 
Confusion
Aggressive 
Maneuver
Abnormal / 
Inadvertent 
Control Input 
/ Maneuver
Improper / 
Ineffective 
Recovery
Inadequate 
Crew Resource 
Monitoring / 
Management 
(PF, PNF, & 
Systems) 
Improper / 
Incorrect / 
Inappropriate 
Procedure 
and/or Action
Fatigue / 
Impairment / 
Incapacitation 
(Includes 
Hypoxia)
Thunderstorms / 
Rain
Wind Shear Wind / 
Turbulence
Wake Vortex Snow / Icing Fog / Haze Night Fixed Moving
6 8 2
External Hazards & Disturbances
Obstacle
None / 
Unknown
Adverse Onboard Conditions
Inclement Weather & Atmospheric Disturbances Poor VisibilityCrew Action / Inaction
cbelcast:
Pilots got confused due to the ASI 
mis-match between pilot and co-
pilot, decreasing co-pilot ASI while 
getting an excessive speed warning, 
and excessive speed warning 
followed by stick shaker
cbelcast:
Crew realized too late that they
were losing speed and altitude 
and disconnected the autopilot 
and applied full thrust; crew 
failed to execute procedures 
for recovery
cbelcast:
Unclear whether 
night conditions 
were a 
contributing factor
 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
27
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments
Uncommanded 
Motions
Oscillatory 
Vehicle 
Response 
(Includes PIO)
Abnormal 
Control for 
Trim / Flight 
and/or 
Control 
Asymmetry
Abnormal / 
Counterintuitive 
Control 
Responses
Abnormal 
Attitude
Abnormal 
Airspeed 
(Includes Low 
Energy)
Abnormal 
Angular 
Rates
Undesired 
Abrupt 
Dynamic 
Response
Abnormal 
Flight 
Trajectory
Uncontrolled 
Descent 
(Includes 
Spiral Dive)
Vmc / 
Departure
Stall / 
Departure 
(Includes 
Falling Leaf, 
Spin)
7
Vehicle Upset Conditions
Abnormal Dynamics & Vehicle Upset Conditions
None / 
Unknown
Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics
cbelcast:
Stick shaker 
activated
Yes / No / Not 
Enough 
Information (NEI)
Comment
Yes / No / Not 
Enough 
Information 
(NEI)
Yes / No / Not 
Enough 
Information 
(NEI)
Mitigation Description References
No Yes Yes
1.  Improved pilot training
2.  NASA NRA with UIUC includes sensor  failure detection and 
isolation (FDI)
3.  NASA SBIRs on Sensor Integrity Management with Scientific 
Systems and Barron Associates (Awarded 2014)
4.  NASA SBIR with Barron Associates on Upset Recovery Guidance 
System
5.  Resilient flight control
1.  
2.  Felemban, Che, Cao, Hovakimyan, and Gregory, “Estimation of 
Airspeed Using Continuous Polynomial Adaptive Estimator,”   2014 
SciTech Conference, National Harbor MD.   
3.  None yet
4.  Gandhi, Neha, Richards, Nathan D., and Bateman, Alec J., 
"Simulator Evaluation of an In‐Cockpit Cueing Systems for Upset 
Recovery," 2014 SciTech Conference, National Harbor, MD.
5.  
Faulty ASI to Autopilot/Autothrottle caused aircraft to pitch up and lower 
airspeed, which led to stall; Conflicting warnings in flight deck (overspeed 
and stick shaker)
Crew Distraction / Preoccupation / Mis‐aligned Focus Flag Potential to Mitigate through Research (Technologies, Training, Procedures, etc.)
Potential Human‐Machine Interface Issue Flag (Includes Displays, Controls, Flight 
Management, Envelope Protection, & Warning Systems that Influence Flight Control)
Comment
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Appendix C:  Worst Case Precursor Analysis Examples 
 
Worst case precursor combinations are illustrated in Figures C.1 and C.2 at the sub-category and precursor levels, 
respectively.  Note that sphere size is directly proportional to number of accidents, and sphere color relates to 
number of fatalities. 
 
 
 
Figure C.1.  Example of Worst Case Precursor Combinations Analysis at the Sub-Category Level, with one 
Combination Indicated for Analysis at Precursor Level (see Figure A.2).  
 
Figure C.2.  Precursor Combinations within Sub-Category Combination of Figure A.1.  
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Worst case precursor sequences are illustrated in Figure C.3 for events initiated by system and component failures, 
and in Figure C.4 for events initiated by inappropriate crew action (or inaction).   
 
 
Figure C.3.  LOC Sequences Initiated by System & Component Failures / Malfunctions.  
Events Fatalities
84 2,175
→ LOC 20 528
→ LOC 1 189
→ Vehicle Upset  → LOC 1 3
→ Vehicle Impairment → LOC 1 0
→ LOC 3 8
→ Vehicle Upset  → LOC 1 0
→ Unknown Abnormal  → LOC 2 118
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 1 121
→ Vehicle Impairment →
Unknown Abnormal 
Dynamics & Vehicle 
Upset Conditions
→  LOC
1 11
→ Vehicle Impairment → Vehicle Upset  → LOC 1 0
→ Obstacle → Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction → Vehicle Upset Conditions → Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics →  LOC 1 0
→  LOC 8 67
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 7 3
→ LOC 2 2
→ Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics  LOC 1 0
→  LOC 13 528
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 2 0
→
System  & Component 
Failures / 
Malfunctions
→  LOC
1 2
→ Obstacle → LOC 1 0
→
Unknown Abnormal 
Dynamics & Vehicle 
Upset Conditions
→  LOC
4 256
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 1 0
→ Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction →
Unknown Abnormal 
Dynamics & Vehicle 
Upset Conditions
→  LOC
1 0
→ Unknown  →  LOC 5 72
→ Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction → Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics → Vehicle Upset Conditions → Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction →  LOC 1 196
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions → Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction → Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics →  LOC 1 0
→
System  & 
Component Failures 
/ Malfunctions
→ Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics →  LOC 1 0
Obstacle → Vehicle Impairment → Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 2 71
Vehicle Upset 
Conditions
Inappropriate Crew 
Action / Inaction
NORMAL 
FLIGHT 
→
Inappropriate Crew 
Action / Inaction
→
→ Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics
System  & 
Component Failures 
/ Malfunctions
→
→ Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction
→ Vehicle Impairment
→
Inclement 
Weather & 
Atmospheric 
Disturbances
→
→
System  & Component Failures / Malfunctions Total
System  & 
Component 
Failures / 
Malfunctions
Inappropriate 
Crew Action / 
Inaction
Abnormal 
Vehicle 
Dynamics
→
→
→
Vehicle 
Upset 
Conditions
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Figure C.4.  LOC Sequences Initiated by Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction.  
 
 
Note that the example results illustrated in Figures C.1 – C.4 are taken from Ref. 10.  
Events Fatalities
42 771
→ LOC 17 126
→ Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics → Vehicle Impairment →  LOC 1 0
→ LOC 1 96
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 1 145
→ Vehicle Impairment → LOC 1 0
→ Poor Visibility → LOC 1 2
→
Unknown Abnormal 
Dynamics & Vehicle 
Upset Conditions
→  LOC
5 153
→
Unknown Abnormal 
Dynamics & Vehicle 
Upset Conditions
→  LOC
2 163
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 1 0
→ Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction → Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 1 5
→ LOC 3 7
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 1 0
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions → Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction →  LOC 1 0
→ Vehicle Impairment → Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 1 0
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 1 19
→ Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction → Vehicle Upset Conditions →  LOC 1 2
→ Obstacle → Vehicle Impairment →
Unknown Abnormal 
Dynamics & Vehicle 
Upset Conditions
→  LOC
2 40
→ Poor Visibility →
System  & 
Component Failures 
/ Malfunctions
→ Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction →
Vehicle 
Upset 
Conditions
→  LOC
1 13
Vehicle Impairment
→ Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics
→
Inclement Weather 
& Atmospheric 
Disturbances
→
System  & 
Component Failures 
/ Malfunctions
Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction Total
NORMAL 
FLIGHT 
→
Inappropriate 
Crew Action / 
Inaction
→ Vehicle Upset Conditions
→ Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction
→
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Appendix D.  Precursor Sequences for Mishaps Involving Blocked Pitot Tubes or Static Ports 
 
The precursor sequences for the blocked pitot tube or static ports mishaps presented in Section III-C are provided below in Figures D.1 – D.8.  The comments and 
flags associated with these mishaps are presented in Tables D.2 – D.3.  The information in Table 3 from Section III-C is repeated here as Table D.1 with the fatal 
accidents nonfatal incidents grouped together. 
Table D.1. LOC Accidents and Incidents from the Data Set Involving Blocked Pitot Tubes or Static Ports, Grouped by Fatal and Nonfatal Events 
 
Accident 
No. Date Location Airline Flight No. Aircraft 
Phase of 
Flight Fatalities 
2 2/6/1996 Dominican Republic Birgenair 301 B-757-225 En Route 189 
14 10/2/1996 Peru AeroPeru 603 B-757 Climb 70 
37 10/10/1997 Uruguay 
Austral 
Lineas 
Aereas 
2553 DC-9 En Route 74 
62 4/7/1999 Ceyhan, Turkey 
THY 
Turkish 
Airlines 
5904 B-737 En Route 6 
260 6/1/2009 
Atlantic 
Ocean (Near 
Sao Paulo 
Archipelago) 
Air France 447 A-330 En Route 228 
142 10/20/2002 Baltimore, Maryland Icelandair 662 B-757 En Route 0 
188 5/12/2005 Missouri Midwest Airlines  MD-90 Initial Climb 0 
254 1/28/2009 Ghana 
Astraeus for 
Ghana 
Airways 
 B-757 Cruise 0 
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Figure D.1.  Precursor Sequence for Fatal Accident No.2 of Table D.1 
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Figure D.2.  Precursor Sequence for Fatal Accident No. 14 of Table D.1 
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Figure D.3.  Precursor Sequence for Accident No. 37 of Table D.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.4.  Precursor Sequence for Accident No. 62 of Table D.1 
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Figure D.5.  Precursor Sequence for Accident No. 260 of Table D.1 
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Figure D.6.  Precursor Sequence for Nonfatal Incident No. 142 of Table D.1 
 
 
 
 
Figure D.7.  Precursor Sequence for Nonfatal Incident No. 188 of Table D.1 
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Figure D.8.  Precursor Sequence for Nonfatal Incident No. 254 of Table D.1 
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Table D.2.  Comments and Flags for Fatal Mishaps #2, #14, #37, #62, #260 
 
 
Date 
Aircraft 
(Fatalities) 
Comments 
Crew Distraction / 
Preoccupation / Misaligned 
Focus 
Potential Human-Machine 
Interface Issue Potential to Mitigate through Research 
2/6/1996 
B757 
(189) 
 No  Yes 
Faulty ASI to 
Autopilot/Autothrottle 
caused aircraft to pitch up 
and lower airspeed, which 
led to stall; Conflicting 
warnings in flight deck 
(overspeed and stick shaker) 
Yes 
1.  Improved pilot training on diagnosing and 
mitigating onboard system failures (including sensor 
system failures and the use of alternate 
instrumentation) 
2.  Improved sensor  failure detection and isolation 
(FDI) systems 
3.  Sensor Integrity Management systems 
4.  Resilient Upset Recovery Guidance and/or 
Automatic Recovery System 
5.  Resilient flight control system 
10/2/1996 
B-757 
(70) 
 Yes 
Crew was distracted by 
erroneous sensor readings 
and flight deck warning 
systems 
Yes 
Numerous conflicting 
warning and alerts were 
sounding simultaneously 
Yes 
1.  Sensor integrity management system capable of 
detecting and mitigating sensor failures (including 
common mode failures) 
2.  Resilient flight control system capable of ensuring 
safety of flight under system failures 
3.  Automatic ground collision avoidance system 
10/10/1997 
DC-9 
(74) 
Sequence details obtained 
from ASN NEI  Yes 
Lack of situational awareness 
or mitigation of anomalous 
airspeed indications, which 
led to premature extension of 
slats 
Yes 
1.  Improved crew training on diagnosing and 
mitigating onboard system failures (including sensor 
systems and the use of alternate instrumentation) 
2.  Sensor integrity management system capable of 
detecting and mitigating sensor failures (including 
blocked pitot tubes and common mode failures) 
3.  Resilient flight control system capable of ensuring 
safety of flight under system failures (including sensor 
system failures) 
4.  Resilient upset recovery system capable of 
providing guidance and/or automatically effecting 
upset recovery under vehicle system failures 
4/7/1999 
B-737 
(6) 
Very little accident 
information available. Yes 
The presence of cabin crew 
in the cockpit probably 
distracted the attention of 
the cockpit crew. 
NEI 
Lack of reliable sensor 
information under icing 
conditions;  lack of 
notification of sensor system 
problem 
Yes 
1.  Improved pilot training relative to use of alternate 
instrumentation 
2.  Improved anti-icing methodologies 
3.  Sensor integrity management system 
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6/1/2009 
A-330 
(228) 
The obstruction of the Pitot 
probes by ice crystals 
during cruise was a 
phenomenon that was 
known but misunderstood 
by the aviation community 
at the time of the accident. 
From an operational 
perspective, the total loss of 
airspeed information that 
resulted from this was a 
failure that was classified in 
the safety model. After 
initial reactions that depend 
upon basic airmanship, it 
was expected that it would 
be rapidly diagnosed by 
pilots and managed where 
necessary by precautionary 
measures on the pitch 
attitude and the thrust, as 
indicated in the associated 
procedure.  The occurrence 
of the failure in the context 
of flight in cruise 
completely surprised the 
pilots of flight AF 447. The 
apparent difficulties with 
aeroplane handling at high 
altitude in turbulence led to 
excessive handling inputs in 
roll and a sharp nose-up 
input by the PF. The 
destabilization that resulted 
from the climbing flight 
path and the evolution in 
the pitch attitude and 
vertical speed was added to 
the erroneous airspeed 
indications and ECAM 
messages, which did not 
help with the diagnosis.   
The combination of the 
ergonomics of the stall 
Yes 
Crew was overwhelmed by 
the multiple hazards 
conditions involving 
external disturbances 
(turbulence), an onboard 
common-mode sensor 
system failure (blockage of 
all pitot tubes due to ice 
crystal formation), lack of 
external sensory 
information (due to night 
low visibility conditions 
over the ocean), and stall 
warning system triggers at 
high altitude during cruise 
Yes 
Inability of the system to 
detect and mitigate sensor 
failures associated with 
blocked pitot tubes; the 
ergonomics of the stall 
warning design;  the lack of 
displays providing situation 
awareness under multiple 
hazards and guidance for 
upset recovery;  flight 
director indications that may 
led the crew to believe that 
their actions were 
appropriate, even though 
they were not; difficulty in 
recognizing and 
understanding the 
implications of a 
reconfiguration in alternate 
law with no angle of attack 
protection 
Yes 
1.  Improved crew training under unexpected and 
abnormal conditions (including multiple hazards 
events) and in the implications of existing 
protections associated with system operational 
modes 
2.  Sensor integrity management system capable of 
detecting and mitigating sensor failures (including 
blocked pitot tubes and common mode sensor 
failures) 
3.  Improved algorithms and displays that provide 
improved situational awareness to the systems and 
crew under multiple hazards conditions 
4.  Resilient flight control system capable of ensuring 
flight safety under multiple hazards (including 
system failures, external disturbances, and 
inappropriate control inputs by the crew and/or 
autoflight systems) 
5.  Resilient upset recovery system capable of 
providing guidance for and/or automatically recovery 
from upset conditions (including stall) under multiple 
hazards conditions 
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warning design, the 
conditions in which airline 
pilots are trained and 
exposed to stalls during 
their professional training 
and the process of recurrent 
training does not generate 
the expected behavior in 
any acceptable reliable way.  
In its current form, 
recognizing the stall 
warning, even associated 
with buffet, supposes that 
the crew accords a 
minimum level of 
“legitimacy” to it. This then 
supposes sufficient previous 
experience of stalls, a 
minimum of cognitive 
availability and 
understanding of the 
situation, knowledge of the 
aeroplane (and its 
protection modes) and its 
flight physics. An 
examination of the current 
training for airline pilots 
does not, in general, provide 
convincing indications of 
the building and 
maintenance of the 
associated skills. 
More generally, the double 
failure of the planned 
procedural responses shows 
the limits of the current 
safety model. When crew 
action is expected, it is 
always supposed that they 
will be capable of initial 
control of the flight path 
and of a rapid diagnosis that 
will allow them to identify 
the correct entry in the 
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dictionary of procedures. A 
crew can be faced with an 
unexpected situation 
leading to a momentary but 
profound loss of 
comprehension. If, in this 
case, the supposed capacity 
for initial mastery and then 
diagnosis is lost, the safety 
model is then in “common 
failure mode”. During this 
event, the initial inability to 
master the flight path also 
made it impossible to 
understand the situation and 
to access the planned 
solution. 
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Table D.3.  Comments and Flags for Nonfatal Mishaps #142, #188, #254 
 
 
Date 
Aircraft 
(Fatalities) 
Comments 
Crew Distraction / 
Preoccupation / Misaligned 
Focus 
Potential Human-Machine 
Interface Issue 
Potential to Mitigate through 
Research 
10/20/2002 
B-757 
(0) 
The pilots indicated that EICAS messages 
appeared and disappeared several times after 
takeoff and during the climb, including the 
messages MACH/SPD TRIM and RUDDER 
RATIO. Checklists for MACH/SPD TRIM 
and RUDDER RATIO messages did not 
mention an unreliable airspeed as a possible 
condition. The modifications associated with 
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-34A0222 
(and mandated by FAA Airworthiness 
Directive 2004-10-15 after the incident), 
which had not been incorporated on the 
incident airplane, would have provided a more 
direct indication of the airspeed anomaly. 
According to information in the Icelandair 
Operations Manual, these EICAS messages (in 
conjunction with disagreements between the 
captain and first officer airspeed indicators) 
may indicate an unreliable airspeed. 
Overspeed indications and simultaneous 
overspeed and stall warnings (both of which 
occurred during the airplane's climb from 
FL330 to FL370) are also cited as further 
indications of a possible unreliable airspeed. 
The crew did take actions in an attempt to 
isolate the anomalies (such as switching from 
the center autopilot to the right autopilot at one 
point during the flight). However, this did not 
affect the flight management computer's use of 
data from the left (captain's) air data system, 
and the erroneous high airspeeds subsequently 
contributed to airplane-nose-up autopilot 
commands during and after the airplane's 
climb to FL370. 
No  Yes 
Lack of a failure detection 
and notification system 
capable of detecting and 
identifying blocked pitot 
tubes; indistinct alerts 
generated by the airplane's 
crew alerting system, which 
added to the flight crew's 
confusion during the flight. 
Yes 
1.  Improved pilot training relative to 
diagnosing and mitigating onboard 
system failures (including sensor 
system failures and use of alternate 
instrumentation) 
2.  Sensor integrity management 
systems capable of detecting, 
identifying and mitigating sensor 
system failures (including blocked 
pitot tubes) 
3.  Resilient flight control and 
guidance system capable of 
mitigating system failures and 
providing situational awareness & 
guidance to the crew 
4.  Resilient upset recovery system 
capable of providing guidance 
and/or automatically effecting upset 
recovery under vehicle system 
failures 
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5/12/2005 
MD-90 
(0) 
Post-incident testing of the airplane's 
mechanical and electronic systems revealed no 
abnormalities that would have accounted for 
the unreliable airspeed indications or the loss 
of control reported by the flight crew. Post-
incident computer modeling also confirmed 
that the airplane performed in a manner 
consistent with all deviations from normal 
flight having been initiated or exacerbated by 
the control inputs of the flight crew. Review of 
flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, 
and flight crew interviews revealed that the 
flight crew's actions during the event were in 
part contradictory with operator's training and 
operational procedures. Specifically, the crew 
initially failed to properly identify and respond 
to the erroneous airspeed indications that were 
presented and failed to coordinate their 
recovery of the airplane to controlled flight. 
No  Yes 
Lack of system failure 
detection capability for a 
blocked pitot tube 
Yes 
1.  Improved crew training on 
diagnosing and mitigating onboard 
system failures (including sensor 
systems and the use of alternate 
instrumentation) 
2.  Sensor integrity management 
system capable of detecting and 
mitigating sensor failures (including 
blocked pitot tubes and common 
mode failures) 
3.  Resilient flight control system 
capable of ensuring safety of flight 
under system failures (including 
sensor system failures) 
4.  Resilient upset recovery system 
capable of providing guidance 
and/or automatically effecting upset 
recovery under vehicle system 
failures 
1/28/2009 
B-757 
(0) 
The commander, uncertain as to what was 
failing, believed that a stick-pusher had 
activated*. He disengaged the automatics and 
lowered the aircraft’s nose, then handed over 
control to the co-pilot when he became aware 
that the co-pilot was on the controls.  The FD’s 
were disengaged and the aircraft returned to 
Accra with the co-pilot flying. 
The company has amended their engineering 
procedures to include the fitting of pitot covers 
and blanks when the aircraft is on the ground 
during long turnarounds.  There were times 
during this flight where the flight crew were 
confused as to what was happening. In this 
incident, the commander recognized a failure 
of his ASI before 80 kt and the takeoff could 
have been safely rejected. Instead, he 
continued the takeoff using the co-pilot’s and 
standby ASIs and encountered a number of 
related emergencies. These eventually led to 
the declaration of a mayday and return to the 
departure airfield. Although the commander 
considered that conditions were suitable for 
resolving the problem when airborne, a low 
No  Yes 
Lack of system failure 
detection capability for a 
blocked pitot tube;  
Numerous opportunities for 
mode confusion in existing 
FCS and FMS design and 
operation as well as warning 
and annunciations; 
Purposeful settings by the 
crew to isolate 
malfunctioning equipment 
are overridden by the 
automatic systems without 
notification to the crew 
Yes 
1.  Improved crew training on 
diagnosing and mitigating onboard 
system failures (including sensor 
systems and the use of alternate 
instrumentation) 
2.  Sensor integrity management 
system capable of detecting and 
mitigating sensor failures (including 
blocked pitot tubes and common 
mode failures) 
3.  Resilient flight control system 
capable of ensuring safety of flight 
under system failures (including 
sensor system failures) 
4.  Resilient upset recovery system 
capable of providing guidance 
and/or automatically effecting upset 
recovery under vehicle system 
failures 
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speed rejected takeoff would have been more 
appropriate in these circumstances.  As a result 
of this incident, the company has implemented 
refresher training for its pilots on the AFDS, 
its modes, and operation. A blocked pitot tube 
event is also included as a part of their 
simulator recurrent training. The company 
now advise their crews to reject the takeoff if 
the problem is recognized at speeds below 80 
kt. 
*Note: The Boeing 757 aircraft is not fitted 
with a stick pusher but the commander had 
previously flown an aircraft which had been 
fitted with a stick pusher 
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Appendix E.  Resilient Autonomous Systems Technology Requirements 
 
This Appendix will provide a preliminary roadmap for the development and validation of resilient autonomous 
and semi-autonomous aircraft systems, as illustrated in Figures E.1 and E.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure E.1.  Preliminary Technology Requirements for Resilient Autonomous Safety-Critical Systems. 
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Figure E.2.  Preliminary Technology Validation Requirements for Resilient Autonomous Safety-Critical 
Systems. 
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Dedication 
 
This work is dedicated to the memory and careers of the following researchers who substantially contributed to 
aviation safety through their tireless and dedicated research, and who were taken from the research community in the 
prime of their lives and careers.   
 
Dr. Celeste M. Belcastro 
NASA Langley Research Center 
 
Dr. Gary J. Balas 
University of Minnesota 
 
Mr. David G. Ward 
Barron Associates, Inc. 
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